ABSTRACT
THE DEEP STRUCTURE OF LAW AND MORALITY

This Article argues that morality and law share a deep and pervasive
structure, an analogue of what Noam Chomsky calls the “deep structure” of language.
This structure arises not to resolve linguistic problems of generativity, but rather from the
fact that morality and law engage psychological adaptations with the same natural
function: to allow us to resolve social contract problems flexibly. Drawing on and
extending a number of contemporary insights from evolutionary psychology and
evolutionary game theory, this Article argues that we resolve these problems by
employing a particular class of psychological attitudes, which are neither simply belieflike states nor simply desire-like states, though they bear affinities to both. The attitudes
are “obligata.”
Obligata breathe life into our moral and legal practices, and have a
specific structure. They blend agent-centered attitudes toward persons with attitudes
toward shared standards for action as producing reasons that exclude some arising from
personal interest. Obligata are “judgment-sensitive attitudes”: reasons can be sensibly
asked and offered for them. They incline us to react critically to deviations and perceive
these reactions as warranted. Obligata nevertheless sensitize us to the standard excuses,
thereby allowing us to mend our relationships after some seeming breaches. We express
obligata in the special normative terminology that morality and law share, including in
contexts of discussion and dispute that can become incredibly charged. In these
interactions, obligata allow us to meaningfully disagree, and sometimes thereby reach
consensus, even when our resolutions are not traceable to any particular reasons we
antecedently accepted. This talk thus engages underlying psychosocial mechanisms that
can—in the appropriate social and political circumstances—help us maintain sufficient
agreement over what we owe to one another to live well together. Obligata thereby allow
us to enjoy our lives together. Finally, it is possible that our moral and legal judgments
supervene on natural facts because there are natural facts—about what moral and legal
rules would conduce to all our objective individual interests in the right way—that partly
explain the shape that morality and law take in our lives.
The structure of obligata is the deep structure of morality and law. This
suggests that much of the legal literature—including familiar descriptive and normative
accounts from law and economics scholars—have been presupposing a psychological
picture that is deeply at odds with how we naturally think about obligation. Morality and
law do not arise from, and could not be sustained only by, separable beliefs about the
world and preferences for states of affairs. The challenge raised here runs deeper,
however, than recent empirical work showing we deviate from instrumental rationality in
numerous, systematic ways. Our capacities to reason instrumentally may not figure very
centrally at all in our moral or legal practices, and we may necessarily misunderstand
these normative phenomena if we keep trying to shoehorn them into that model. To
understand morality and law, we must instead understand how our distinctive capacities
to identify and respond appropriately to obligations function.
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Even the casual observer will note that law and morality resemble one
another in numerous and striking ways. Both practices typically consist of rules with
general applicability, which we perceive to have special importance in our lives and to
provide us with personal mandates that can operate irrespective of at least some
consequence. Both purport to provide us with reasons to act that can override other
compelling ones that arise from personal interest. Both also contain a special normative
vocabulary—including terms like “ought,” “duty,” “obligation,” “excuse,” “right,” and
the like1—which terms are essentially contestable2 and irreducible in meaning to any
descriptive statements of natural fact.3 Yet we tend to believe that there can be no
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See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, Introduction, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW vii (1979). Joseph Raz notes that this
characteristic of legal language is sometimes thought to support the natural law thesis that law is
“inescapably moral.” Id. Neither Raz nor I take this conclusion to be inevitable.

2

To say that a term is “essentially contestable” is to say that whatever claims one makes using the term
can be meaningfully debated; terms like these are thus “variously describable” and typically “admit[ ] of
considerable modification in the light of changing circumstances.” W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested
Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 167, 167-78 (1956) (noting that many of our moral and political
concepts are essentially contestable). Ronald Dworkin has argued that a number of features of our legal
discourse in contexts of adjudication establish that our legal concepts are also essentially contestable. See,
e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 103 (1977).
3

The classic source of this insight is G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA, 6-20 (1971). Moore charged any
attempt to define the “good” in purely naturalistic terms as falling prey to a “naturalistic fallacy,” and
clarified ways in which the meaning of this normative concept appear irreducible to any empirically
definable concept. Id. W.D. Ross later extended this form of argument to deontological concepts like
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warranted difference in legal or moral judgment without some difference in the natural
facts.4 And our moral and legal practices are pervaded, in similar ways, by standards that
not only purport to provide us with reasons to act but also to criticize deviations in ways
that imply the permissibility of certain forms of sanction or coercion5—as well as by a
portfolio of standard excuses that operate to defeat such criticisms in strikingly similar
ways.6
This Article argues that these resemblances are more than superficial.
They arise from the fact that law and morality share a deep and pervasive structure, an
analogue in the moral and legal domain of what Noam Chomsky has called the “deep
structure” or “universal grammar” of language.7 This structure arises from the fact that
morality and law engage psychological adaptations with the same natural function: to
allow us to resolve various classes of social contract problems8 flexibly. Drawing on and
extending a number of contemporary insights from evolutionary psychology and
“right” and “duty,” and charged Moore with falling into a similar fallacy when trying to define the right in
terms of the good. See W.D. ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 8-11 (1930).
4

The technical term for this is to say that these normative terms “supervene” on natural facts. To say that
a moral property “supervenes” on a non-moral property is to say that two items cannot differ in their moral
properties without differing in some non-moral property as well. See, e.g., R.M. HARE, THE LANGUAGE OF
MORALS 80 (1952). It is common to observe that moral properties apparently supervene on natural facts.
See, e.g., Michael Ridge, Moral Non-Naturalism § 6, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-non-naturalism; Michael S. Moore, Moral Reality Revisited, 90
MICH. L. REV. 2424, 2515-17 (1992). Our legal judgments also apparently supervene on natural facts, as
is reflected in the thought that “like cases should be treated alike” under the law. See, e.g., John E.
MacKinnon, Law and Tenderness in Bernhard Schlink’s The Reader, 16 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 179,
187 (2004) (observing this link and defining “legal supervenience” as the claim that “[i]f ‘all things,’ or
relevant features, are equal, . . . then the legal character that attaches to that range of features must be ‘the
same’ in all cases where that range occurs.”); Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, 82
IOWA L. REV. 739, 764 n.96 (1997) (distinguishing ways that legal and moral judgments supervene on
natural facts, but observing that legal judgments supervene in a complex way).
5

See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 82-91 (2d ed. 1961) (making this point in relation to
morality and law); RICHARD B. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 163-70 (1979) (making
point in relation to morality).
6

See generally H.L.A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE
MODERN SCIENCE 81 (Sidney Hook ed., 1958), reprinted in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 28, 2953 (1968) (noting pervasiveness of certain specific excuses in different areas of the law); Richard B.
Brandt, A Utilitarian Theory of Excuses, 78 PHIL. REV. 337 (1969), reprinted in RICHARD B. BRANDT,
MORALITY, UTILITARIANISM, AND RIGHTS 215-234 (1992) (noting pervasiveness of these excuses in
morality); Richard B. Brandt, A Motivational Theory of Excuses in the Criminal Law, in 27 NOMOS:
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 165 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1983), reprinted in BRANDT, supra,
at 235-262.
OF

7

See, e.g., NOAM CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE 29-30 (1975) (defining “universal grammar”);
NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 136 (1965) (using terminology of “deep structure”
to refer to this phenomenon).
8

The term “social contract problem” will be used most generally to refer most generally to any situation in
which all parties beginning from a suitably defined starting position would agree to be bound by certain
rules on the condition that all others would be similarly bound. This general definition admits of a number
of alternative specifications, and the precise sense in which our moral and legal psychologies function to
resolve social contract problems will be elaborated further in the course of this Article.
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evolutionary game theory, this Article will develop the claim that we resolve these
problems by employing a particular class of psychological attitudes, which are neither
simply belief-like states nor simply desire-like states, though they bear affinities to both.
The attitudes will be called “obligata,” for reasons to be explained. 9 As they appear in
us, they are a peculiar blend of propositional attitudes,10 deontological motivations to
follow rules, and reciprocally conditioned expectations of and attitudes toward other
persons. Obligata are also judgment-sensitive attitudes—in the sense that reasons can be
sensibly asked or offered for them11—and they are bound up with a number of motives
and familiar moral emotions, like shame and guilt.12 They are the attitudes we express
when we engage in moral and legal discussion.
Obligata constitute our sense of obligation, and thereby breathe life into
our moral and legal practices. Their structure is the deep structure of law and morality.
An understanding of obligata will, moreover, have important
consequences not only for legal theory but also for how we should approach normative
proposals in law. There is a well-developed and long-standing strain of scholarly
literature—predominantly, though not only, arising in the law and economics
movement—that either explicitly or implicitly presupposes a very different psychological
picture of us as acting primarily on the basis of separable beliefs about the world and
desires (or preferences) for various states of affairs.13 On this common view, our
practical reasoning is purely instrumental, and proponents of this view sometimes claim
that we only have individual reasons to pursue things like our considered preferences.
More recently, a number of researchers have begun to document numerous ways that we
in fact deviate from this so-called Homo Economicus model, and have made efforts to
accommodate the fact that we sometimes apparently exhibit desires that are altruistic or
9

See Section C, infra.

10

A “propositional attitude” is a relational mental state that connects a person to a proposition, or to what is
asserted in uttering a sentence. Propositions are often thought of as the simplest components of thought
and as expressive of meanings, or contents, that can be true or false. There are a number of common
attitudes that we can have to a given proposition. We can believe the proposition; hope for it; wonder about
it; expect it; and so on. All of these would thus be propositional attitudes on the orthodox definition.

11

The term “judgment-sensitive attitude” is used in the sense that T.M. Scanlon has made familiar.
Scanlon defines “judgment-sensitive attitudes,” with innocent circularity for present purposes, as the class
of attitudes that “an ideally rational person would come to have whenever that person judged there to be
sufficient reasons for them and that would, in an ideally rational person, ‘extinguish’ when the person
judged them not to be supported by reasons of the appropriate kind.” T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO
EACH OTHER 20 (2000). Our judgments that something is right or wrong, or is required or prohibited by
law, are sensitive to reasons in this sense.
12

For a description of the link between moral emotions like shame and guilt to our normative practices, see
Daniel M.T. Fessler & Kevin J. Haley, The Strategy of Affect: Emotions in Human Cooperation, in
GENETIC AND CULTURAL EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 7-37 (Peter Hammerstein ed., 2003); Jonathan
Haidt, The Moral Emotions, in HANDBOOK OF AFFECTIVE SCIENCES 852-870 (R.J. Davidson et al. eds.,
2003).
13

See, e.g. Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U.L. REV. 333, 333 (describing this
model as providing the basis for the “standard tropes of public law”).
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other-regarding.14 The challenge posed in this Article will, however, run deeper. It will
suggest that the basic social psychological building blocks out of which we create and
sustain our moral and legal relations have, and must have, a deep structure that is
fundamentally at odds with current economic frameworks.15 If this is correct, then much
of the scholarly literature has been presupposing a psychological picture of us that is
importantly incomplete, and the contours of which play a much smaller role in morality
and law that has often been assumed. If we hope to approach normative questions about
the law from the right angle and with the right clarity, we must therefore learn to
understand better how our natural sense of obligation functions.
A.

PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS16

As indicated, the main portions of this Article will argue that law and
morality share a deep and pervasive structure and will elaborate what, precisely, that
structure consists in. Before turning to that project, a number of preliminary
clarifications are in order.
As an initial matter, the domain of morality at issue in this Article is
narrower than what some people mean by the term. In ordinary speech, people
sometimes use the term “moral criticism” to refer to a wide range of objections that
people sometimes raise to various forms of behavior or conduct.17 As T.M Scanlon has
observed, “[v]arious forms of behavior, such as premarital sex, homosexuality, idleness,
and wastefulness, are often considered immoral even when they do not harm other people
or violate any duties to them.”18 When people engage in this kind of criticism, they do
not, however, typically believe that people have obligations to others with respect to
these activities. To think that one has an obligation to perform an act is to think the
following four things: that (i) there is a standard of action that has some general
applicability, or applicability irrespective of the antecedent desires or interests of the
persons to whom it applies; (ii) the standard provides each person to whom it applies with
a reason to act, irrespective of her antecedent desires and interests; (iii) the standard
provides each person to whom it applies with a reason to act that overrides or excludes19
14

See, e.g., THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR (Franceso Parisi & Vernon L. Smith
eds., 2005); Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF 170-200 (2000)
(discussing empirical evidence and modern attempts to account for some of it from within basic economic
frameworks).
15

For another set of reasons to question whether our commitments to social norms can be understood
instrumentally, see Anderson, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., 170-200.

16

This section has profited from many helpful conversations with Brianna Fuller, who will—I sincerely
hope—join us in legal academia one day.

17

See generally SCANLON, supra note 11, at 6.

18

Id. Neither Scanlon nor I are committed to the view that objections of this kind are necessarily merited
or morally serious.
19

The term “exclusionary reason” is used here in the sense made familiar by Joseph Raz. See, e.g., JOSEPH
RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35-45 (1990). This use does not entail commitment to Raz’s
particular way of categorizing first and second order reasons, or to his idea that moral reasons are first order
reasons that can be silenced by legally authoritative reasons.
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other compelling ones arising from antecedent desire or interest;20 and (iv) breach of the
standard gives some other person or group standing to complain and/or warrants what
would otherwise be resented, namely, certain forms of punishment or coercion for noncompliance.21 Scanlon has usefully referred to this part of morality as “what we owe to
each other,” and has suggested that “this part of morality comprises a distinct subject
matter, unified by a single manner of reasoning and by a common motivational basis.”22
The law similarly purports to provide us with obligations that meet the
four criteria under discussion. Indeed, when a real or alleged political authority attempts
to induce people to act by means of imperatives backed by force, those imperatives will
only be considered legal imperatives if they meet the same four criteria.23 The domain of
obligation is therefore the place where morality and law most plausibly intersect,24 and
this area of intersection will be the sole focus of this Article. The central thesis of this
20

For a useful discussion of how these three characteristics are needed to give sense to the peculiar
normative force (or ‘categoricity’) that moral obligations purport to have, see David Brink, Kantian
Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy, in ETHICS AND PRACTICAL REASON 255-67, 280-87
(Garrett Cullity & Berys Gaut eds., 1997). Brink labels these three characteristics of moral obligations
their (i) “inescapability”; their (ii) “authority”; and their (iii) “supremacy” (in the sense that moral reasons
purportedly provide us with overriding reasons). See id. at 255. I have, however, replaced Brink’s notion
of “supremacy” with Raz’s notion of an “exclusionary reason” because strict overridingness is not needed
to account for the normative force of obligations in the broadest sense, and Raz’s notion can capture the full
range of possible obligations—whether moral, legal or otherwise—that we perceive ourselves to be under.
See generally Joseph Raz, Legitimate Authority, reprinted in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 1, at 1625 (accounting for legal obligations in terms of exclusionary reasons).
21

Stephen Darwall has recently emphasized that we cannot even begin to understand the distinction
between the normativity of obligations and those of other purportedly categorical requirements, such as the
requirements of logic, without conceding an intrinsic relation between obligations and others’ standing to
raise claims against one another. See Stephen Darwall, “Because I Want It,” 18 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 129,
136-38, 144-53 (2001). Because morality and law purport to provide us with obligations, and not only
categorical requirements like those of logic, this fourth criterion is needed to complete Brink’s analysis.
For an excellent early description of moral and legal obligation that is prescient in its sensitivity to this fact,
see HART, supra note 5, at 82-91.
22

SCANLON, supra note 11 at 6-7. I am, however, using the term “obligation” more broadly than either
Scanlon or early Hart to refer to this whole domain. Scanlon uses the term “obligation” to refer only to
those things that we owe to each other “arising from specific actions or undertakings.” Id. Hart once
limited his use of the term “obligation” to refer to those duties that “may be voluntarily incurred or created,
. . . are owed to special persons (who have rights), [and] do not arise out of the character of the actions
which are obligatory but out of the relationship of the parties.” H.L.A. Hart, Are There Any Natural
Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. 175, 179 n.7 (1955).

23

For detailed discussion of these points, see HART, supra note 5, at 18-25.

24

Bernard Williams has, for example, famously argued that morality employs a special notion of
obligation and gives obligations a special significance in deliberation. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS
AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 174-75 (1985). For Williams, this is a problem: He complains that
morality turns everything into obligations, and considers deliberation to issue only in requirements and
permissions, thus leaving out of the picture many other important dimensions of value. Id. at 175, 180-96.
The same “criticism” would apply to the law, however, and Williams’s criticism can thus be understood as
suggesting that morality contains only a legalized conception of obligation. Be this as it may, this is the
domainof morality that most plausibly intersects with the law, and this area of intersection will thus be the
sole focus of this Article.
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Article can thus be viewed as answering an important question in moral and legal
psychology, namely: what psychological capacities must we have in order to identify and
respond appropriately to obligations? The claim will be that the relevant capacities have
a number of structural features, which will be elaborated.
A second important clarification relates the precise analogy that this
Article will claim with Chomsky’s work. Chomsky has argued that beneath the
seemingly infinite variety of languages and linguistic expressions, there is a simpler set of
rules25—which he calls “Universal Grammar”—that give us the capacity to identify and
respond appropriately to language and to embed propositions into an indefinitely
complex set of thoughts and statements.26 Ever since Chomsky published his now
familiar views, it has become fashionable—perhaps all too fashionable—to claim that
there are “deep structures” to all kinds of complex social phenomena.27 It is, however,
important to take precaution before claiming any such extensions. Chomsky’s claims
about language find support in a constellation of distinctive considerations, which
together reciprocally reinforce one another and provide his views with a particularly firm
foundation. It is, moreover, the juxtaposition of these considerations that gives content to
his precise notion that the features he identifies are “structural”—or innate and universal
conditions of our capacities for natural language.28 The most important of these bases are
the following:
1. Universality. The linguistic phenomena that Chomsky calls “Universal
Grammar” appear in all human languages, as disparate as many of them are on
the surface, and as unrelated as they sometimes are by history or common
ancestry.29
2. Developmental Psychology. Work in developmental psychology suggests that
children develop linguistic competence in invariant stages and at relatively

25

Chomsky may be using the term “rule” metaphorically when he talks about these phenomena as rules.
What he is describing are conditions of linguistic intelligibility for us, at least if we are to use language to
with its distinctive range of expression, but these conditions may not actually be “rules” in any ordinary
sense of the word.

26

See, e.g., CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, supra note 7, at 29-35; CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF A
THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 7, at 136-42.
27

George P. Fletcher, for example, observed as early as 1997 that “a LEXIS check . . . revealed 247 usages
of the phrase ‘deep structure,’ some in unexpected contexts.” George P. Fletcher, What Law Is Like, 50
SMU L. REV. 1599, 1604 n.22. He points to the law review article The Deep Structure of Capital Gains as
an example of such an unexpected context. Id.
28

See, e.g., CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, supra note 7, at 29 (“Let us define ‘universal
grammar’ . . . as the system of principles, conditions, and rules that are elements of properties of all human
languages not merely by accident but by [biological] necessity . . . Thus [universal grammar] can be taken
as expressing ‘the essence of human language.’ [Universal grammar] will be invariant among humans.
[Universal grammar] will specify what language learning must achieve, if it takes place successfully. . .
.What is learned must have the properties of [universal grammar], though it will have other properties as
well, accidental properties. Each human language will conform to [universal grammar]; language will
differ in other, accidental properties.”).
29

See id.
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predictable times.30 The capacities typically develop in ways that outstrip in
complexity anything that the child could have learned solely from external
sources of input or experience, at the relevant stages in his or her
development.31
3. Other Psychological Evidence. Our linguistic competence can sometimes
malfunction, even while many of our other cognitive and psychological
capacities continue to operate perfectly well.32 This fact could be explained if
we had a specific adaptive capacity for language, which can selectively
malfunction.33
4. Functional Considerations: Generativity. Our linguistic capacities allow us to
express and understand a seemingly limitless number of thoughts, in part by
embedding simpler thoughts into more complex linguistic or syntactic
structures.34 Chomsky has argued that in order to explain this feature of
language, we must posit a more basic set of rules or conventions that allow us
to combine simpler thoughts into more complex ones in specific ways. In
technical jargon, we must view our linguistic capacities as “discrete
combinatorial systems,” which use a set of basic grammatical rules to allow us
to express and understand the broad range of thoughts that we find expressible

30

See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 32-45, 262-96 (collecting evidence from studies of
language development in children that children reinvent the rules of generative grammar at typical stages in
their development).
31

See, e.g., id. at 39-45, 276-96; CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, supra note 7, at 4 (“A human
language is a system of remarkable complexity. To come to know a human language would be an
extraordinary intellectual achievement for a creature not specifically designed to accomplish this task. A
normal child acquires this knowledge on relatively slight exposure and without specific training. He can
then quite effortlessly make use of an intricate structure of specific rules and guiding principles to convey
his thoughts and feelings to others, arousing in them novel ideas and subtle perceptions and judgments. For
the conscious mind, not specifically designed for the purpose, it remains a distant goal to reconstruct and
comprehend what the child has done intuitively and with minimal effort.”); CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE
THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 7, at 27 (“A theory of linguistic structure . . . attributes tacit knowledge of
[linguistic] universals to the child. It proposes, then, that the child approaches the data with the
presumption that they are drawn from a language of a certain antecedently well-defined type, his problem
being to determine which of the (humanly) possible language is that of the community in which he is
placed. Language learning would be impossible unless this were the case.”). This form of argument has
come to be known as argument from “poverty of the stimulus.” See, e.g., Editors’ Introduction in NOAM
CHOMSKY, ON NATURE AND LANGUAGE 5-6.
32

See, e.g., PINKER, supra note 30, at 45
- 53, 297-331 (collecting evidence of this phenomenon). For
example, patients who have been injured in Broca’s area of the brain are unable to distinguish between
grammatical and ungrammatical sentences, speaking instead in stunted phrases and strings of words. The
opposite is true of those injured in Wernicke’s area of the brain: they speak in grammatical sentences but
produce nonsense, having lost the ability to retrieve words from their mental dictionary. See id. at 309-13.
33

See id. at 299, 313.

34

See, e.g., CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF A THEORY OF SYNTAX, supra note 7, at 136-42; CHOMSKY,
REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE supra note 7, at 29-35; PINKER, supra note 30, at 84-125 .
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in all natural languages. 35 This aspect of language is sometimes referred as its
“generativity.” 36
How far might one go in finding analogies in morality and law for these
four classes of considerations? As discussed more fully below, the literature now
contains useful and suggestive work that one might try to analogize to the first three
classes of considerations, but not the fourth. The fourth set is, however, absolutely
critical to project of distinguishing genuinely structural features of our psychologies and
lives from features that are merely accidental, even if universal or common. 37 In what
follows, this section will therefore indicate what the current state of our knowledge is
with regard to analogues of the first three classes of considerations. It will then discuss
why there is no direct analogy to be made with regard to the fourth and clarify the
implications of this fact for morality and law. It will then propose an alternative
functional problem that morality and law solve that can replace language’s generativity in
developing a plausible account of the deep structure of morality and law.
Let us begin, then, with the first class of considerations and ask whether
our moral and legal practices exhibit any universalities of the relevant kind. A number of
people have tried to identify such universalities,38 and one particularly probing and
representative account is due to Donald E. Brown.39 Inspired by Chomsky’s conception
of Universal Grammar, Brown has combed the wider ethnographic record looking for
other culturally universal patterns in human life. Among those he claims to find are some
that should be suggestive for moral and legal theory: giving, lending, possession, sense of
self versus other, responsibility, voluntary versus involuntary behavior, intention,
empathy, living in groups (which claim a territory and have a sense of being a distinct
people), status and prestige (both assigned—by kinship, age, sex—and achieved),
exchanges of labor, goods, and services, reciprocity (including retaliation), gifts, social
reasoning, coalitions, government (in the sense of binding collective decisions about
public affairs), authoritative rules, rights and obligation (including authoritative rules
35

PINKER, supra note 30, at 84-88.

36

See, e.g., DONALD LORITZ, HOW THE BRAIN EVOLVED LANGUAGE 166 (1999).

37

Chomsky relies heavily on the generativity of language to discern which from among the many patterns
in human language are genuinely structural features, and which are merely accidental homologues. See,
e.g., CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE supra note 7, at 29; see also PINKER, supra note 30, at 32-45.
38

See, e.g., John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, The Psychological Foundations of Culture, in THE ADAPTED
MIND 88-93 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds,, 1992); GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL
LAW 5 (1998) (defending the view that there is a “universal grammar” to the criminal law); Jim Chen, Law
as a Species of Language Acquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263, 1279 (1995) (arguing that the “existence of
universal grammar reinforces the discovery of universals in other language-based disciplines” including
law); JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 83-84 (1980); Martha Nussbaum, Non-Relative
Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE (Martha Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds.,
1993); A.J.M. MILNE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMAN DIVERSITY 4-7 (1986); John O. McGinnis, The Human
Constitution and Constitutive Law: A Prolegomenon, 8 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211-12, 230-39 (1997)
(suggesting that work in the social sciences involving evolutionary theories of human nature should begin
to inform more legal scholarship and attempting to identify the deep structure of the Constitution). None of
these accounts identifies as structural the precise features developed in this Article.
39

See DONALD E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991).

8

against violence, rape and murder), punishment, conflict (which is deplored), the seeking
of redress for wrongs, mediation, in-group/out-group conflicts, property, envy, and a
sense of right and wrong.40 Within the legal literature, people like George Fletcher have
similarly argued that specific areas of the law, like the criminal law, exhibit a number of
identifiable features in all human cultures.41 Work like this is suggestive, though, for
reasons already discussed, any attempt to distinguish between common or universal
features of our moral and legal practices and those that are structural in a more robust
sense, akin to Chomsky’s, must draw upon additional considerations.
The second class of considerations relates to developmental psychology.
There is now a well-established body of evidence that our capacities to engage in moral
reasoning develop in some invariant and universal ways. These findings began with the
work of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg, the latter of whom has proposed that
children, cross-culturally, progress through six identifiable stages of development in their
moral reasoning, and do so in an invariant manner.42 Experiments conducted by
Kohlberg and his followers suggest by age ten, children will distinguish “right” from
“wrong” but are typically motivated primarily by avoidance of punishment (Stage 1).43
After attaining this stage, children begin to become motivated by desires for reward or
benefit, and begin to develop the ability to reason instrumentally about exchanges to meet
these interests (Stage 2).44 It is then typically in early adolescence that individuals begin
to develop a more robust sense of obligation.45 This typically begins as a set of
judgments based on role obligations and stereotypical conceptions of the good person and
how good persons would be motivated (Stage 3).46 Sometimes individuals develop
further to make a distinctive class of judgments about obligation based on respect for
uniformities, rules, law, and the authority legitimate in a social system (Stage 4).47
Kohlberg initially proposed two further stages,48 but a number of
40

See id. at 130-41; see also PINKER, supra note 30, at 413-15 (discussing Brown’s work).

41

FLETCHER, supra note 38. Fletcher describes this “universal grammar” as a hidden unity that underlies
all criminal justice systems despite their many surface variations. For a useful discussion of how Fletcher’s
use of the term “universal grammar” differs from Chomsky’s in relying primarily on evidence of
universality, see Stuart P. Green, The Universal Grammar of the Criminal Law, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2104,
2108-113 (2000).
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2 LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL DEVELOPMENT (1984); Lawrence Kohlberg, From Is to
Ought, in COGNITIVE DEVELOPMENT AND EPISTEMOLOGY 151, 176 (Theodore Mischel ed., 1971).
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2 KOHLBERG, supra note 42, at 52 tbl.1.6, 624-26; Anne Colby & Lawrence Kohlberg, Invariant
Sequence and Internal Consistency in Moral Judgment Stages, in MORALITY, MORAL BEHAVIOR AND
MORAL DEVELOPMENT 42, (William M. Kurtines & Jacob L. Gewirtz, eds. 1984)
44

2 KOHLBERG, supra note 42, at 626.

45

Id. at 626, 628-29, 649.

46

Id. at 628-30.

47

Id. at 631-33.
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In Kohlberg’s proposed Stage 5, individuals consider principles of fairness and equality, and reason
about the right taking into account of social contracts and broad utilitarian principles. Id. at 634-36. At
Stage 6, individuals purportedly make decisions that they derive in part from abstract universal moral
principles. Id. at 636-39. The central tenet that sophisticated reasoning is a prerequisite for a moral
maturity has, however, been challenged and is—in my view—contradicted by the weight of the evidence.
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subsequent studies suggest that only developments to stage 3 are genuinely crosscultural.49 In smaller, rural social settings, stage 3 reasoning is the typical end-point in
the development of our moral capacities, whereas developments to stage 4 reasoning
arise rather robustly as people begin to live in larger, cosmopolitan settings with higher
population densities and less consensus over the content of morality.50 These facts are
suggestive of capacities that may develop in distinctive ways in different social
circumstances to allow us to respond to the distinctive social problems that we happen to
face.51
Our understanding of how our moral and legal psychologies develop is
still in flux and is likely to undergo a number of refinements in the coming decades.
Mary Louise Arnold has, for example, reviewed a number of studies of subjects who share highly
developed commitments to moral causes. She found that “some may have perceived their commitments
primarily in terms of social justice . . . and . . . may have sought to remedy them in a highly analytical,
reasoned manner” while “[o]thers . . . may have perceived and responded to similar (or different) social ills
with a more purely empathic or altruistic sensitivity toward human suffering.” Mary Louise Arnold, Stage,
Sequence, and Sequels: Changing Conceptions of Morality Post-Kohlberg, 12 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 365,
377 (2000). “In both sets of cases, a strong moral self or personality is clearly evident, but the role of
complex moral reasoning is likely far more relevant in the former cases than in the latter. Moreover, both
instances present valid conceptions of moral maturity and should be equally represented and valued in
moral development theory.” Id.
In my view, Stage 5 and 6 reasoning are therefore best viewed as descriptions of culturally local
attempts to reflect on stage 4 reasoning and discover its underlying principles. See, e.g., 2 KOHLBERG,
supra note 42, at 57 (“It is possible to view Stages 4, 5 and 6 as alternative types of mature response rather
than as a sequence.”); id. at 636 (defining Stage 6 by reference to Rawls’s political philosophy); James Rest
et al., A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach, 11 EDUC. PSYCHOL. REV. 291, 302-03 (1999) (noting that Kohlberg
used Rawls’s particular political philosophy to characterize stage 6, collecting criticisms of this linkage and
of Kohlberg’s interpretations of Rawls, and suggesting a broader characterization of stage 5 and 6
reasoning that would encompass a broad range of philosophical reflections on morality). Criticisms like
these apply only to stages 5 and 6 in Kohlberg’s taxonomy. Criticisms of this kind may, however, help
explain recent moves to recharacterize Kohlberg’s stages as “schema” rather than “invariant steps.” See,
e.g., id. at 291, 311-319.
49

See, e.g., Carolyn P. Edwards, Societal Complexity and Moral Development, 3 ETHOS 505, 511 (1975);
ANTHONY J. CORTESE, ETHNIC ETHICS 109 (1990).
50

Kohlberg, supra note 42, at 178; Edwards, supra note 49, at 509-10; CORTESE, supra note 49, at 109
(“Stages 4/5 and 5 were absent in every traditional tribal or village folk society whether Western or nonWestern. There are significant differences in moral judgment between folk and urban societies, not
between Western and non-Western ones.”) (collecting citations); John Snarey, Cross-Cultural Universality
of Social-Moral Development, 97 PSYCHOL. BULL. 202, 217-18 (1985).

51

It should be noted Piaget, Kohlberg and many of their successors did not interpret the seemingly
invariant sequences of our moral development as suggestive of adaptations for a sense of obligation. See
ELLIOT TURIEL, THE CULTURE OF MORALITY 97-98 (moral learning as the aptitude to construct more and
more complex moral judgments). The data would, however, be well explained from an adaptationist
perspective. The data about stages 3 and 4 are suggestive, for example, of a capacity to identify and
respond to obligations that responds flexibly the needs of the social conditions that one finds oneself in. A
shared sense of moral obligation may be well-suited to smaller social group interactions, whereas a sense of
legal obligation, based on a sense of political authority, may be needed to resolve social contract problems
arising in larger groups, which do not share a highly coordinated moral sense. If so, then we would expect
legal systems to arise robustly as we move from smaller hunter-gatherer living to larger-scale settled
agricultural living, with higher population densities, and this is in fact what the ethnographic record reveals.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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Importantly, however, the most compelling recent developments challenge the above
description only at the level of detail and ultimately reinforce the basic proposition that
our moral psychologies develop in stable and predictable ways. Elliot Turiel and some of
his followers have, for example, performed a number of recent and important
experiments suggesting that children at a very young age distinguish between wrongs that
they perceive to depend on external authority and wrongs that they perceive to be
authority independent.52 By the age of five—which is much younger than Kohlberg’s
theory would predict—most children will think that some wrongs—typically, those that
involve harm to others—are wrong regardless of whether any authority figure such as a
parent or religious entity is thought to say they are wrong.53 These same children will,
however, say that other wrongs—namely, those that do not involve obvious harms to
others, such as speaking out of turn in class—are only wrong if certain authorities (such
as a classroom teacher) have said so.54 Turiel calls this the “moral/conventional”
distinction,55 and these attitudes are likely important to the distinctions we later draw
between moral and legal obligations. The fact that these psychological phenomena arise
robustly at specific stages in childhood development nevertheless reinforces the idea that
our capacities to engage in moral and legal thought and practice have a particular
developmental etiology.56 What further research should help clarify is how precisely this
capacity develops and how best to describe our capacities at various stages.57
52

TURIEL, supra note 51, at 108-112 (collecting citations). One of Turiel’s studies asked children aged
five to eleven whether it was all right for a preschool to allow (i) hitting and (ii) the removal of clothing on
warm days. The majority of the children interviewed distinguished between the two cases, and thought that
only the second permission was all right. One child explained that hitting was not allowed because it “hurts
other people, [and] hurting is not good,” but said that a rule allowing children to remove their clothes on
hot days was acceptable “because that is the rule . . . . If that’s what the boss wants to do, he can do that.”
Id. at 108-09. Similar studies were conducted by Larry and Maria Nucci, who observed children
responding to social breaches in the classroom and on the playground. Among their findings was the
following: children typically explain their judgments about conventional wrongs with rule statements
(“you’re not supposed to . . .”) and respond to violations with commands or ridicule, whereas children
typically respond to perceived moral transgressions with retaliation and explain their judgments with injury
or loss statements (“that hurt”), statements relating to perceived injustice, or statements about how it would
feel to be in another’s shoes. See Larry P. Nucci & Maria Santiago Nucci, Children’s Social Interactions in
the Context of Moral and Conventional Transgressions, 53 CHILD DEV. 403-12 (1982); Larry P. Nucci &
Maria Santiago Nucci, Children’s Responses To Moral and Conventional Transgression in Free-Play
Settings, 53 CHILD DEV. 1337-1342 (1982).
53

TURIEL, supra note 51, at 108-12.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 111-12

56

See also JESSE J. PRINZ, THE EMOTIONAL CONSTRUCTION OF MORALS 14-15 (forthcoming 2005)
selections available at http://instruct1.cit.cornell.edu/courses/phi663/PrinzECM-Excerpt.pdf (discussing
these and other recent developments in the psychological literature suggesting that our moral and legal
psychologies develop in predictable ways during childhood).
57

Carol Gilligan has produced another important criticism of Kohlberg’s work. Observing that some early
studies suggested that men attained Stage 4 reasoning more often than women, Gilligan has argued that it
would reflect a sex or gender bias to view Kohlberg’s six proposed stages of moral development in terms of
increasing levels of moral maturity. Gilligan has proposed that women instead exhibit a distinctive form of
moral reasoning—which she characterizes as “care oriented” rather than “justice oriented”—with a
distinctive etiology. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 18-23, 100-05 (1982).
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The third category of considerations is other empirical considerations.
Here too suggestive work has been done, primarily in the studies of psychopathology.
These studies suggest that psychopaths often have perfectly functioning capacities of
many kinds, and that what they lack is a discrete bundle of interrelated psychological
phenomena that should be familiar from our moral and legal practices.58 For example,
they are (i) less capable of feeling certain characteristic moral emotions like remorse,
shame and guilt;59 (ii) less capable of empathy and role-taking;60 and (iii) less capable of
perceiving what the rest of us take to be the distinctive authority or compelling nature of
law and morality.61
With regard to this last point, psychopaths do seem capable—at least to
some extent—of learning what people call “right” and “wrong” (or “required by law” and
“against the law”) in their society, and of learning what reactions typically follow from
conduct that is in this sense prohibited.62 They will also often use the special normative
terminology that most of us use to make moral and legal judgments to refer to such
conduct. When psychopaths make their judgments, they do not, however, appear
intrinsically moved by them in the way that most of us are: they are neither moved to
respond directly to morality or law, though they can be moved by thoughts of potential
sanctions, nor do they understand these critical reactions to be warranted by compelling
reasons.63 These further implications appear to be part of what we mean when we
Subsequent experiments have, however, called a number of Gilligan’s factual assumptions into question.
See, e.g., L.J. Walker, Sex Differences in the Development of Moral Reasoning, 55 CHILD DEV. 677-91
(1984) (presenting meta-analysis of empirical literature suggesting that sex differences in Kohlberg’s stage
levels disappeared once education and occupation were controlled); Eva E. A. Skoe et al., The Influence of
Sex and Gender-Role Identity on Moral Cognition and Prosocial Personality Traits, 46 SEX ROLES 295,
304-07 (2002); CORTESE, supra note 49, at 99-101. Some of the research suggests that, in fact, both men
and women rate care dilemmas as more important that justice dilemmas, and that women are, all other
things equal, better at both Stage 3 and Stage 4 reasoning. See, e.g., Skoeet al., supra, at 301-02, tbl.I, 307.
To the extent that fewer women exhibit Stage 4 reasoning, it is tempting to conclude that this reflects a
familiar cultural failure: many cultures limit the social circumstances in which women participate, such that
Stage 3 reasoning may naturally become predominant for those persons. This may occur in any culture that
channels women into “caring” activities and a focus on the family, and not as frequently into the political
sphere where negotiating relationships with outsiders is required. See, e.g., id. at 305.
58

See generally PRINZ, supra note 56, at 16-20, TURIEL, supra note 56, at 16-20 (describing the
psychology of psychopaths); HERVEY CLECKLEY, THE MASK OF SANITY (4th ed. 1964) (same).
59

See, e.g., ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE – THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS
AMONG US 33-57 (1999) (“Psychopaths show a stunning lack of concern for the devastating effects their
actions have on others. Often they are completely forthright about the matter, calmly stating that they have
no sense of guilt, are not sorry for the pain they have caused, and that there is no reason for them to be
concerned.”); PRINZ, supra note 56, at 16.
60

See, e.g., HARE, supra note 59 (“[Psychopaths] seen unable to ‘get into the skin’ or to ‘walk in the
shoes’ of others, except in a purely intellectual sense.”); JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 107-08
(1993); PRINZ, supra note 52, at 16.
61

See, e.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Death: A Kantian Essay on Psychopathy, 82 ETHICS 284, 286 (1972)
.
(noting that psychopaths are not moved by morality or law); PRINZ, supra note 56, at 16-17
62

Murphy, supra note 61, at 286; PRINZ, supra note 56, at 17-20.

63

Murphy, supra note 61, at 286; PRINZ, supra note 56, at 17-20.

12

sincerely take moral and legal obligations to have their distinctive kinds of authority.
And these differences between psychopaths and ordinary persons would be wellexplained if we had a distinctive adaptive capacity to identify and respond appropriately
to obligations, which can be selectively disrupted in some individuals.
It is, however, at this critical point that any proposed analogy between
language, on the one hand, and law and morality, on the other, breaks down. The fourth
set of considerations that support Chomsky’s views on language relate to its generativity,
and the distinctive function that human language serves in allowing us to express
indefinitely many thoughts by means of a discrete combinatorial system.64 This has led
many, including John Rawls most prominently, to suggest that an analogous theory of
morality and our sense of justice should contain a “generative grammar,” in
approximately Chomsky’s sense.65 But a careful look at our moral and legal judgments
suggests that they do not reflect any distinctive problem of generativity that could be
properly analogized to that of language. We do make all kinds of moral and legal
judgments—saying, for example, that some things are “wrong” or are “against the law”—
and we can embed these judgments into more complex syntactical structures, thus
revealing that our moral and legal thought is as richly flexible as our thought in any other
domain. This dimension of flexibility is, however, wholly derivative of that of language,
and tells us nothing specific about morality or law. Moreover, the more basic judgments
upon which these general grammatical rules operate appear to be ascribing properties like
“rightness” or “legality” to various actions. If we are to explain how children can learn to
apply properties like these to indefinitely many situations based only on a finite number
of learning stimuli, we must—as Rawls has also noted—presume some psychological
capacities to resolve “what linguists and cognitive scientists call the ‘projection
problem’—roughly, “the ability of normal persons to make systematic and stable moral
judgments about an indefinite number of cases of ‘first impression,’ i.e., novel fact
patterns falling outside their previous experience.”66 This same problem arises whenever
we learn to apply the concept for a given property, however, and does not yet raise the
need of a discrete combinatorial system or generative grammar. To see this, notice that
this class of problems would arise for any property even if our linguistic capacities
involved only simple thoughts ascribing properties to actions or events, and did not yet
give us the capacity to embed these thoughts into more complex syntactic structures.
Hence, the capacities we use to resolve the projection problems inherent in moral and
legal thought do not appear to involve resolutions of any particular problems of
generativity.
There is no point forcing an analogy beyond its power to illuminate. What
would be needed to render plausible the claim that morality and law share a deep
64

See supra notes 30-32 & accompanying text.

65

See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 47 (1971); John Mikhail, Law, Science, and Morality: A
Review of Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1057, 1091
n.204 (2002). Chomsky has himself suggested that his work in linguistics might provide a “suggestive
model for inquiry into other domains of human competence and action that are not quite so amenable to
direct investigation.” CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, supra note 7, at 5.
66

Mikhail, supra note 65, at 1090 n.202 (2002) (comparing relevant passages from Rawls and Chomsky
for this proposition).
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structure is not a defense of the (ultimately implausible) claim that they function as
discrete combinatorial systems but rather the identification of a genuine and specific
function that our moral and legal psychologies share, along with a compelling argument
that clarifies how serving this function would require certain psychological conditions
that in fact pervade our moral and legal practices in the way that would be predicted by
such a function. The relevant function—or so this Article will argue—is that morality
and law allow us to resolve social contract problems of a variety of forms, and to do so in
a flexible manner. The main sections of this Article will aim to establish this point, and
to trace out its implications for our understanding of which precise features of our moral
and legal practices are genuinely “structural” in the sense that they are universal,
recurrent and pervasive conditions for our moral psychologies to serve their natural
functions in a stable manner.
There is a long and familiar tradition of trying to account for moral or
political right in social contractarian terms.67 This Article will not, however, depend on
any such normative considerations to argue for the particular natural function that it
attributes to our moral and legal psychologies. The main argument will instead simply
begin by asking what kinds of capacities we would need to resolve social contract
problems. The Article will then proceed in stages by clarifying various features that we
should expect of any such capacities and then testing these predictions against the
available evidence from a wide range of sources, including: moral and legal philosophy,
anthropology, psychology, primatology (and other animals studies where relevant),
ordinary language and evolutionary theory. Each layer of the argument will provide
added support for the emerging conclusion that the proposed function is in fact the
natural function of the attitudes that breathe life into our moral and legal practices, and
each layer will illuminate further features of our moral and legal psychologies that should
thus be deemed “structural” in the relevant sense.
Before turning to this project, one final clarification is in order to prevent
an important misunderstanding. This Article will sometimes draw on arguments rooted
in evolutionary psychology and evolutionary game theory to clarify structural features of
our moral and legal psychologies. The use of such resources to explain features of our
67

Social contractarians account for moral or political right in terms of “principles that are, or would be, the
object of a suitable agreement between equals.”
Stephen Darwall, Introduction, in
CONTRACTARIANISM/CONTRACTUALISM 1 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003). Classical social contract theorists
include Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. See, e.g., THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN
(W.W. Norton & Co. 1997) (1651); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
1988) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Great Books Foundation 1948) (1762).
Important contemporary versions of the view have been defended by Stephen Darwall, David Gauthier,
John Rawls, and T.M. Scanlon. See, e.g., STEPHEN DARWALL, MORALITY AND THE SECOND-PERSONAL
STANDPOINT (forthcoming, on file with author); DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); JOHN
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993); SCANLON, supra note
11. The particular views of these theorists often differ along a number of important dimensions, including:
(i) whether they use a contractarian apparatus to account for moral or political/legal authority, or both; (ii)
whether they make reference to actual or hypothetical agreements; (iii) how they picture the relevant
original bargaining situation (sometimes called the “state of nature” or “original position”) and the equality
inherent in it; and (iv) how they picture the psychologies of the relevant bargainers. A more recent
distinction in the literature is between “‘contractarianism, where the parties’ equality is merely de facto
and their choice of principles rationally self-interested, and contractualism, which proceeds from an ideal
of reasonable reciprocity or fairness between moral equals.” Darwall, Introduction, supra.
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social psychologies might raise familiar concerns given the number of questionable uses
to which evolutionary theory has been put to purportedly justify substantive normative
proposals. As examples, one need only think of (i) the eugenics movement, which drew
heavily on evolutionary conceptions of fitness purportedly to justify the intentional and
systematic eradication of some persons from our ongoing gene pool;68 (ii) Herbert
Spencer’s claim that laissez-faire economics could be justified in terms of evolutionary
concepts like survival of the fittest;69 or, indeed, (iii) the use of evolutionary theory to
purportedly justify everything “from the extermination of ethnic groups and the forced
sterilization of the poor to restrictive immigration laws and legally institutionalized sex
and race discrimination.”70 A distinct but related concern might arise if evolutionary
theory were being used being used to try to cabinet what is morally or legally possible for
us.71
None of the claims in this Article should raise these familiar concerns.
Although this Article will identify a number of structural features of our moral and legal
psychologies, these claims will be perfectly consistent with the broadest range of moral
and legal views. It will, for example, be logically consistent with everything that is said
here for a given culture or an individual to believe that any particular thing is morally
required or prohibited, or, even, that everything is morally permissible. The same full
range of logical possibilities will arise in terms of the possible contents of the law.
Moreover, nothing in the explanatory claims will by themselves foreclose any particular
normative positions on what moral or legal positions are legitimate, correct, worth
cultivating or otherwise conducive to human welfare. In my view, the fact that we can
identify and respond appropriately to obligations characterizes a distinctive dimension of
human freedom and human possibility. Hence, the claims in this article should be viewed
not as placing limitations on human freedom but as clarifying what a particular
dimension of human freedom amounts to.72

68

See generally, e.g., MARK H. HALLER, EUGENICS: HEREDITARIAN ATTITUDES IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 34 (1963) (“[E]ugenics was the . . . offspring of Darwinian evolution, a natural and doubtless inevitable
outgrowth of currents of thought that developed from the publication . . . of Charles Darwin’s The Origin of
Species.”); DANIEL J. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS 12, 180-83 (rev. ed. 1995) (chronicling the use
of evolutionary thinking to support various eugenicist programs).
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See generally, e.g., PETER SINGER, A DARWINIAN LEFT: POLITICAL, EVOLUTION AND COOPERATION 11
(2000) (“Herbert Spencer, who was more than willing to draw ethical implications from evolution,
provided the defenders of laissez-faire capitalism with intellectual foundations that they used to oppose
state interference with market forces.”).
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Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 38, at 34-35.
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These concerns would naturally dovetail if evolutionary theory were being used to suggest that certain
facts about us that would otherwise be normatively objectionable are in some sense necessary and
unavoidable and therefore justifiable. Factors like these make me very sympathetic to Phil Kitcher’s way
of describing what he calls “the history of brave, but disastrous, ventures into evolutionary ethics.” Phil
Kitcher, Psychological Altruism, Evolutionary Origins, and Moral Rules, 89 PHIL. STUD. 283, 283 (1998).
72

Indeed, there are some views of freedom—those in the broadly Kantian tradition—that would deem
human freedom, or autonomy, to arise only once we have the capacity to step back from our antecedent
desires and interests and respond to reasons that are categorical in the way that moral and legal obligations
purportedly are. For the classic statement of this view, see IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE
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On the other hand, a clear understanding of how these capacities function
is likely to help clarify what would be involved in normative proposals that would engage
these capacities. Here, an analogy with language is again helpful. The deep structure of
language is—on Chomsky’s view—part of what gives us the capacity to understand and
express the rich variety of thoughts that we see in all languages, and to learn and use
languages so naturally. One might try to construct a system of communication for the
same purpose that does not employ these natural capacities, but the evidence suggests
that such systems of communication require excessive conscious processing and thought,
are difficult to learn and unstable in human memory, and do not have nearly the richness
and flexibility of expression of languages that directly employ our native linguistic
capacities.73 While our capacities to identify and respond appropriately to obligations
may give us the freedom to understand obligations with any particular content, a similar
point may apply to our moral and legal practices. The attitudes that allow us to respond
to moral and legal obligations are—for reasons to be explained below—a bundle of
psychological phenomena, which tend to come together as part of a distinctive syndrome.
Hence, while normative assessments about the appropriate content of morality and law
may be useful, and while it may be useful to discuss the appropriate roles of morality and
law in our lives, it may be very difficult for us to sustain normative proposals that would
require engagement of parts of our moral or legal psychologies along with an
abandonment of the rest. As with the analogue in language, we may be able to respond to
such normative proposals only haltingly, with great difficulty, or in an unstable manner.
If so, then these are facts that we should understand about ourselves. An understanding
of these facts will likely bear on what normative questions about morality and law are
genuine and live.
B. A STARTING DILEMMA: OUR CAPACITIES TO RESOLVE SOCIAL
CONTRACT PROBLEMS

METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785); see also CHRISTINE KORSGAARD, THE
SOURCES OF NORMATIVITY (1996).
73

CHOMSKY, REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE supra note 7, at 29 (“If we were to construct a language
violating [universal grammar], we would find that it could not be learned [as a human language]. That is, it
would not be learnable under normal conditions of access and exposure to data. Possibly it could be
learned by application of other faculties of mind; [human languages meeting the requirements of universal
grammar do] not exhaust the capacities of the human mind. This invented language might be learned as a
puzzle, or its grammar might be discovered by scientific inquiry over the course of generations . . . . But
discovery of the grammar of this language would not be comparable to language learning . . . .”). One
might get a sense of the limitations inherent in communication without deep grammar by observing socalled “pidgin” languages. These languages typically arise whenever two groups with different native
tongues are forced to interact and work with one another without a shared language. Pidgins are primitive
attempts to communicate, typically by using strings of words from one or another native language. Pidgins
have little in the way of grammar to facilitate the full range of expression to which we are accustomed,
however, and pidgins can only be used for relatively simple tasks. These languages should thus be
contrasted with those that second generation speakers develop when exposed to pidgins during their crucial
language learning windows. These children typically develop fully grammatical and expressive languages
called “creoles,” which do allow for the full range of expression of natural language. PINKER supra note
30, at 33-35.
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This section begins the substantive arguments of the Article with a thought
experiment. Imagine that we had all of the ordinary psychological capacities that we now
have but no adaptive capacity that functioned to allow us to resolve social contract
problems. We would presumably still have all kinds of ordinary cognitive capacities, and
could therefore form all kinds of beliefs about the world. We would also presumably still
have a broad array of motives, including most of what we typically think of as “desires.”
It is, in fact, an open question—at least at this stage—whether we would be lacking
anything at all.
Given these starting assumptions, one might also develop a plausible
account of practical reasoning—or of how we reason about what to do—that is wholly
consistent with a broadly naturalistic worldview. Following Stephen Darwall, one might
define an “agent’s reasons for action” as those considerations that both (i) explain an
agent’s action and (ii) explain it from a perspective internal to the agent or as an
expression of the agent’s conception of what seemed to speak in favor of the alternative
at the time.74 Reasons like this are thus either causes or intimately bound up with causes,
which motivate actions.75 It can be deeply puzzling how to fit reasons for action into a
naturalistic worldview, but, as a number of people have observed, desiring something
typically involves a tendency to see it as desirable or good, or as providing one with a
reason to pursue it.76 When coupled with relevant beliefs, desires of this kind might
therefore motivate an action and allow us to explain it as an expression of the agent’s
conception of what seemed to speak in favor of it.
To take a stock example, a person might desire an apple that she sees on a
tree, and, in desiring it, see it as desirable or good. She might also believe that she would
need help to get the apple. Practical reflection might therefore lead the person to decide
to seek help to get the apple, which decision might translate into the help seeking action.
If so, then the person’s action could be explained in an unproblematic way by the belief
and desire under discussion. Of course, the person herself would be taking the object of
her belief (namely, the fact that she needs help) and the seeming desirability of the apple
as her reasons for action.77 But these perceived facts would have the right kind of
motivational force needed to explain her actions because these thoughts would
themselves be in part expressive of the belief and desire under discussion. It is, in fact,
common to think that human actions typically arise from a combination of beliefs and
desires in roughly this manner.78 Support for this view derives from the plausibility of
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the psychological and causal stories it proposes, and from its consistency with a broadly
naturalistic worldview.
There is, however, room for reasonable disagreement at this point as to
whether there are any objective facts about desirability or our personal good that explain
our corresponding beliefs or if these beliefs are merely projections of our desires.
Presumably, only entities that are part of the natural world can have causal powers.
Hence, in order to elaborate an objectivist view, one would need to specify natural facts
that plausibly constitute a person’s objective good (or what is objectively desirable for
her) along with a plausible psychological account of how knowledge of these facts might
motivate action. One would also need to provide a plausible naturalistic account of how
we might have epistemic access to these particular facts. Peter Railton has provided the
most promising account of the relevant type. 79 He has articulated a plausible naturalistic
account of a person’s objective interests,80 and has collected a number of broad
theoretical grounds for believing that we have what he calls a “wants/interests
mechanism,” or a psychological mechanism that reorients our desires, however
imperfectly, and “permits individuals to achieve self-conscious and un-self-conscious
learning about their interests through experience.”81 If this hypothesis is correct, then
facts about what is objectively in our interests may explain our actions in part by
engaging desires that make us see certain things as desirable or good.
Others—like David Gauthier—have expressed skepticism about the notion
of an objective interest.82 For skeptics, our beliefs that certain things are good or
desirable are often better thought of merely as projections of our desires, with nothing
further to ground them.83 Still, the idea that these desires give us reasons for action is
often thought unproblematic, and, in fact, an agent’s good or utility is often defined, more
subjectively, in terms of the satisfaction of such desires.84 Most of the definitions of
utility that are common in the economics literature fall into this category, as they define
an agent’s utility or good in terms of the maximization of things like considered
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preferences.85 Theorists in this vein often assume that practical rationality requires us to
maximize our individual utility in this sense.86
Whether in objectivist or subjectivist terms, the psychological assumptions
under discussion can thus be used to define a metric for individual desirability or interest,
either rooted in or related to a person’s considered beliefs and desires. Importantly,
however, nothing has been said that explains how we might identify and respond
appropriately to obligations, as opposed to these ordinary reasons for action.87 It is,
moreover, common to think that obligations prove a much more problematic notion. As
indicated earlier, I believe an answer to this question will arise, indirectly, from a
clarification of the capacities we would need to resolve social contract problems as
defined by the metric for individual desirability under discussion here. Social contract
problems have the underlying game-theoretic structure of an n-person prisoners’
dilemma—a decision situation that many take to be of central importance to moral, legal,
political and social philosophy.88 This section will thus proceed by asking what
capacities we would need to resolve these problems, and will focus the analysis by
drawing attention to a number of familiar problems that would arise if, as is sometimes
assumed, we must resolve them starting from a blank slate, armed only with separable
beliefs and desires to decide what to do. This picture of human psychology and
interaction is one that will ultimately be rejected, but some of the problems it raises will
help motivate the alternative this Article will propose.
Let us turn, then, to social contract problems. Social contract problems
have a well-known structure, which would—as it turns out—make it extraordinarily
difficult to understand how we could ever have the internal capacity to resolve them from
this kind of starting point. Social contract problems arise whenever we could all do better
by agreeing to be bound by some standard of action if that were the price of having all (or
a significant majority of) others be similarly bound. The resolution of such problems
thus indisputably requires a capacity on the part of each to be motivated to act in
accordance with the relevant shared standards for action on the condition that all (or a
85
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significant majority of) others are similarly motivated. What is less obvious, but equally
true, is that the sustained resolution of these problems requires, in addition, a mutually
concordant system of expectations among the members of the group concerning one
anothers’ motivations, one that inclines the group toward a relevant cooperative (rather
than defecting) equilibrium.89 Only with such a mutually concordant system of
expectations in place will the perceived conditions needed to engender the shared motives
to act in accordance with the social contract persist.
Social contract problems are also a species of what has in the last several
decades increasingly come to be known as commitment problems.90 These are typically
defined as any dynamic, strategic problem in which an individual can obtain more
desirable or self-interested results by giving up certain options or by guaranteeing
others—in short, by making commitments.91 Commitment problems arise whenever a
commitment is the price of some action or reciprocal commitment on the part of one or
more others. This kind of problem can also arise when the threat of a commitment is
needed to change the way one or more others will behave. Hence, according to Thomas
Schelling, “[t]o commit is to relinquish some options, eliminate some choices, surrender
some control over one’s future behavior—and [to do] so with a purpose. The purpose is
to influence someone else’s choices.”92 There is broad agreement in the literature on
commitment problems that commitments are strategies that work by changing what
others believe about us.93 In the case of social contract problems, this orthodox view
89
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would entail that we solve these problems by committing ourselves, conditionally, to the
terms of a social contract, and by expressing our conditional commitments to one another
in order to let everyone know that we are willing partners and thereby induce everyone
else who is willing to make the relevant reciprocal commitments to us.
But there is a difficulty inherent in this orthodox view. For how exactly
are we to do or say anything that could convey this kind of information, something that
could serve as evidence, in some recognizable sense of the word, for a belief that the
conditions required for us to exhibit our commitments are in place? Given our initial
assumptions, an explicit agreement, consisting of reciprocal promises, could not serve as
a rational basis for the formation of a mutually concordant system of expectations on its
own. This is because the value of a capacity to make promises is said to derive from its
ability to induce others to do things that they would not otherwise do. But reciprocal
promises could only justify promisors in forming the belief that reciprocal commitments
have been taken on if they already expect one another to be committed to a rule of
promise keeping. There is thus the prior and familiar question as to what would justify
these expectations, and no explicit agreement could do this work alone on pain of regress.
If explicit agreement cannot alone form the rational basis for a relevant system of
mutually concordant expectations in these circumstances, and if each member’s
commitments are conditioned on such expectations, then how can social contract
problems be resolved in the first instance?94
One possibility should be set aside from the start. There are sometimes
circumstances in which we can give up certain options or guarantee others in a
sufficiently trustworthy manner simply by altering features of our external situation, such
that different alternatives become more or less possible or desirable. The use of collateral
to secure performance is an example of this kind of resolution, as is Hobbes’s proposal
that we establish a Leviathan with sovereign power to enforce the terms of our social
contracts.95 In cases like these, the commitment is secured by changing features of our
external situation, however, and, hence, without the need for any internal capacity to
fulfill our commitments and/or refrain from acting on our desires. Unfortunately,
security mechanisms are not always available, and some—such as the establishment of a
political authority—can themselves require the resolution of a collective action problem
that has precisely the same form as the social contract problem that it was originally
meant to resolve.96 The important point to recognize for the present purposes is that
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security mechanisms ultimately allow us to dissolve social contract problems, not solve
them. Perhaps what we call “obligations” are, upon closer examination, nothing more
than systems of motives supported by security mechanisms “all the way down.” But if
so, then we would not need an internal capacity to respond to these so-called
“obligations,” and the distinction between systems of “obligation,” in this sense, and
systems of coercion would ultimately come to naught.97 What this shows is that if we
have an internal capacity to resolve social contract problems, the capacity cannot consist
in our use of any such security mechanisms, or of their known consequences, to generate
the relevant systems of mutually concordant expectations.98
One might think that ordinary induction could instead do the trick of
producing the relevant system of expectations. There is, however, a pragmatic problem
with this suggestion. Even if we were all conditionally committed to a rule of promise
keeping, or, more directly, to a set of norms for mutual advantage that we might contract
into by relying on such a shared rule, the initial absence of the relevant system of
expectations would mean that none of us would expect the conditions to obtain in which
our commitments would lay claims on our individual conduct. This gap in expectation
would, in turn, become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy: with no expectations that these
conditions obtain, none of us would take ourselves to be obligated to act in accordance
with the rules in question, and, hence, none of us would exhibit any committed
behavior.99 But then none of the conditions needed to engender our commitments would
exist, and few, if any, commitments would show up to experience.
Here is a perhaps too-quick conclusion that we might draw from these
considerations, but one that will be given additional justification in the ensuing sections:
In order to solve social contract problems, we apparently need a mutually concordant
system of expectations that runs ahead of the evidence and is, perhaps, even in some
utility, no psychology allowing only for expected-utility calculations relating to whether to obey sovereign
commands, including sovereign enforcement commands, could allow for the creation of an entity with such
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sanctioning activities or express disapproval, and, hence, something besides utility-maximization must
generally sustain a norm of sanctioning. See JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 132-33 (1989).
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ways recalcitrant to the evidence. We apparently need something closer to shared
attitudes of unsecured trust than individual beliefs based on evidence of
trustworthiness.100 But this suggestion only makes the notion that we might have an
internal capacity to solve social contract problems even more mysterious. For what could
warrant this trust, if not evidence of trustworthiness, and what guarantees that any
unsecured expectations we might have would form part of a mutually concordant system?
Trust is, moreover, ordinarily sensitive to evidence of trustworthiness, and, indeed, it
would seem to have to be to serve its ordinary function. So what can this proposed
relation to evidence amount to if not blind and misdirected trust?
At the same time, overcoming these obstacles is critical for many of the
more familiar ways in which we resolve social contract problems. Expressing reciprocal
promises and engaging in many other analogous actions may in fact work quite well in
ordinary life, but the arguments in this section suggest that they do so only against the
backdrop of certain shared psychological facts that can seem quite mysterious from a
naturalistic perspective.

C.

A FIRST BLUSH RESOLUTION: OBLIGATA

A careful look at the obstacles to resolving social contract problems that
the last section highlighted will begin to point to a resolution. We could solve social
contract problems, without security mechanisms, if we had an internal capacity that
employed a particular constellation of attitudes, each fixated on a common set of contents
that purported to attribute a particular property to all actions falling under a shared
standard. As a first blush functional description, the constellation—which will be called
an obligatum for ease of reference—would have to consist, at minimum, in (i)
motivations to perform the act with the purported property on the supposition that all (or
a significant majority of others) are similarly motivated; (ii) suppositions that all others
are similarly motivated; and (iii) suppositions that all others suppose all others to be
similarly motivated, and, hence, that all others have suppositions that would, if true, show
them to be in circumstances that we might recognize as ones of generalized reciprocity.
Contents specifying that a particular action (or its absence) had the property in question
in a specific set of circumstances would reflect the thought that the relevant action is
required (or forbidden, respectively) in those same circumstances.101 If we were to share
obligata with the same contents, and if the contents were to embody resolutions to a
social contract problem, then we would begin our encounters with one another with the
suppositions needed to trigger our respective motivations to fulfill the terms of the
relevant social contract.
This and the following sections will argue that we have obligata, the
contents of which naturally tend toward mutually concordant systems of motive and
100
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supposition, and that an understanding of these attitudes is crucial for understanding how
moral and legal obligations operate. To sustain this claim, this first blush definition will
have to undergo a number of important refinements. To foreshadow, the final definition
will stipulate that obligata include (iv) not ordinary suppositions but ones that will be
called “normative suppositions” (which involve a certain amount of unsecured trust); and
(v) certain secondary stabilizing attitudes. Later sections will argue that obligata provide
us with reasons that we perceive to be (vi) exclusionary and (vii) agent-centered.102
These refinements will be explained as they are introduced. They should be understood
as deep structural features of obligata, and, hence, of morality and law. This section will
nevertheless begin by using the more minimal definition as set forth in elements (i)-(iii).
The term “obligatum” may sound odd at first, and perhaps even overly
technical, but it resonates with two terms that will help to clarify what exactly is being
proposed. First, the term “obligatum” resonates with the adjective “obligato,” which
means indispensable, or not to be left out,103 as in an obligato accompaniment, which is
an integral part of a larger musical performance. For reasons that will become clear
below, the idea that each part of an obligatum is an integral and indispensable part of the
functioning whole is an idea that the term “obligatum” should vividly connote. Second,
the term “obligatum” brings to mind the idea of an obligation. This is also an appropriate
connotation because obligata are—on the view elaborated here—part of the normal
psychological background in which obligations can be said to arise and exist. Obligata
are in fact the very attitudes we employ when we sustain conventions, the phenomena
that David Hume famously described as follows:
When [a] common sense of interest is mutually express’d, and is known to
[all], it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour. And this may
properly enough be call’d a convention or agreement betwixt us, tho’
without the interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have
a reference to those of the other, and are perform’d upon the supposition,
that something is to be perform’d on the other part.104
Hume thought that “conventions” of this kind animated our sense of justice and moral
and political obligation.105
Moving on to substance, there are two likely sources of resistance to the
idea that we might have internal functional states with the properties of obligata. First,
there is the problem already canvassed, concerning why, absent a rational basis, we
would ever have the suppositions that go into obligata, or suppose that they will form part
102
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of a mutually concordant system with others’ motives and suppositions. This might seem
to involve a coincidence bordering on the miraculous. Second, there is a basic
plausibility issue with the claim that we share attitudes of this particular kind. Obligata
motivate us to act in self-sacrificing manners, and include suppositions that others will
act in a similar way. It might seem implausible, at best, and tragically naïve, at worst, to
think that nature would endow us with unsecured suppositions of others’ self-sacrificing
behavior. This implausibility is heightened when we reflect on the fact that there are
numerous well-known difficulties understanding how altruistic or self-sacrificing traits
might evolve and persist in the natural world.106
Fortunately, we will not be forced to countenance these problems if we
approach the issue from a contemporary perspective, as illuminated by a number of
recent theoretical developments. Modern work on convention, beginning with that of
Thomas C. Schelling,107 John Nash108 and David Lewis,109 has, for example, helped show
how certain kinds of coordinated attitudes like perceptions of salience can be critical for
the resolution of strategic game-theoretic situations that bear important similarities to the
social contract problems under discussion here. There has also been a great deal of recent
work on the evolution of altruism and our sense of justice, including work by a number of
philosophers such as Philip Kitcher,110 Allan Gibbard111 and Elliot Sober,112 to name a
few. The burgeoning field of evolutionary psychology has also offered a way of
approaching the mind that allows for naturalistically sound functional categorizations,
and for the identification of real psychological capacities, that might otherwise elude
philosophical and empirical inquiry—a fact that is being increasingly acknowledged
within the philosophy of mind. And finally, new work by evolutionary game-theorists,
such as Brian Skyrms,113 Phil Kitcher114 and Robert Sugden,115 has helped to show how a
106

See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, The Evolution of Human Altruism, 90 J. PHIL. 497, 497 (1993) (“The problem
of altruism has loomed large in evolutionary biology ever since Charles Darwin. How do tendencies to
kindly, even self-sacrificial, behavior evolve in an unkind, Darwinian world?”); Kitcher, Psychological
Altruism, supra note 71, at 288; Allan Gibbard, Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice, 7 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 33-34 (P.A. French et al. eds., 1982); Neven Sesardic, Recent Work on Human Altruism and
Evolution, 106 ETHICS 128, 128 (1995) (“[It is common to believe that] inveterately altruistic creatures
have a pathetic tendency to die before reproducing their kind.”).
107

See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).

108

See John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155-162 (1950).

109

See DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION (Blackwell Publishers 2002) (1969).

110

See, e.g., Kitcher, The Evolution of Human Altruism, supra note 106, at 497-516; Kitcher,
Psychological Altruism, supra note 71, at 283-316.
111

See, e.g., ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF NORMATIVE JUDGMENT
(1990); Gibbard, supra note 106, at 31- 46.
112

See, e.g., Elliott Sober, What Is Evolutionary Altruism?, 14 CAN. J. PHIL. 75-99 (1988); Elliot Sober,
Did Evolution Make Us Psychological Egoists?, reprinted in FROM A BIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 8-27
(1994).

113

See e.g., BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); Brian Skyrms, Darwin Meets
The Logic of Decision: Correlation in Evolutionary Game Theory, 61 PHIL. SCI. 503-28 (1994).

114

See, e.g., Philip Kitcher, The Evolution of Human Altruism, supra note 106, at 497-516; Philip Kitcher,
Psychological Altruism, supra note 71, at 283-316.

25

look at our pasts as presenting us with repeated game-theoretic problems can help to
explain the evolution and persistence of various features of our moral psychologies—
even some that are apparently altruistic. These and related developments have helped
pave the way for the claims that will be defended here, though the claims themselves will
be new and are particular to this account.
Let us begin, then, with a look at evolutionary psychology—a field that
would appear at first blush to be oblique to the project of illuminating moral phenomena
but that will ultimately prove to yield several unexpected and fruitful insights.116 Recent
work in evolutionary psychology has helped establish the fecundity of viewing the mind
as a bundle of domain-specific and content-laden mechanisms, which sometimes interact
with one another and/or with cues from the social or material environment in highly
complicated ways, but that are ultimately finely tuned to solve specific and longstanding
adaptive problems that recurred in our environment of evolutionary adaptation.117
Adaptations of this kind are generally species-typical and often universal to normal
members of the species.118
The most important point to recognize for the present purposes is that an
adaptationist approach to the mind can allow for the identification of mental phenomena
by function, and without the need of imposing the assumption that all of our attitudes
must be separated neatly by their direction of fit.119 When this basic intuition is
connected up with the facts about obligata that have already been canvassed, the claim
that we employ obligata to solve social contract problems can be exposed as the
unexpected beneficiary of plausibility considerations arising out of a naturalistic
approach to the mind. There would, after all, be clear adaptive advantages to a capacity
to solve many social contract problems, and, hence, natural selection could explain how
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See, e.g., Sugden, supra note 88, at 73-99.
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For a definitive collection of essays defending the basic adaptationist framework employed in modern
evolutionary psychology and presenting numerous suggestive applications, see THE ADAPTED MIND, supra
note 38.
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See, e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, supra note 38, at 49-123 (explaining paradigm and collecting evidence).
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Although Cosmides and Tooby often speak as if adaptive traits must be universal in the sense that
nearly every member of a species must have the trait, see id. at 64, evolutionary dynamics can, in fact, be
used to explain not only so-called “monomorphic” adaptions but also so-called “polymorphic” adaptations.
This distinction arises because some traits have adaptive values that are frequency dependent, in the sense
that their adapative value depends on how many other members of the group have the same trait. Hence,
evolutionary dynamics can sometimes drive a species to so-called “polymorphic” outcomes in which a
portfolio of distinguishable adaptations arise and remain stable in distinct ratios. See, e.g., PAUL E.
GRIFFITHS, WHAT EMOTIONS REALLY ARE: THE PROBLEM OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CATEGORIES 62-64 (1997).
This possibility need not be canvassed here because the structural features of obligata that will be discussed
do not appear polymorphic. The issue of whether there are nevertheless polymorphic aspects to our moral
and legal psychologies is an interesting one, but one that goes beyond the scope of this Article.
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The term “direction of fit” is used in the sense that John Searle, among others, has made familiar. See,
e.g., JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY 7-9 (1983). Searle believes that most representational mental states
can be divided into two main categories, based on their direction of fit. Beliefs are said to have a “mind-toworld” direction of fit because their function is to represent things in a way that matches facts about the
world. See id. at 8. Desires are said to have a “world-to-mind” direction of fit because their function is to
represent non-actual states of affairs and to bring about changes in the world to make them actual in at least
some circumstances. See id. at 7-8.
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obligata might proliferate through a population, as an adaptation that functions by
allowing its bearers to reap the cooperative benefits of these resolutions. The last section
suggested, moreover, that creatures set up to await adequate evidence of the relevant
commitments would spend their lives waiting; whereas creatures endowed with obligata,
and with their peculiar kind of suppositions, which run ahead of the evidence, could
begin to reap the benefits of cooperation. This in itself provides a plausible naturalistic
explanation for why we might expect obligata to exist, if we can in fact resolve social
contract problems without security mechanisms. And—in fact—the evidence suggests
that we do.120
At the same time, an evolutionary explanation for the emergence of
obligata would entail that the suppositions that go into them have precisely the dual kind
of responsiveness and recalcitrance to evidence that we often see in our normative
practices—and that can otherwise seem so puzzling. An unconditional motivation to
fulfill one’s part of a social contract would incline its bearers to act in self-sacrificing
ways for the benefit not only of others who are similarly inclined but also of those who
have no such inclinations, thus endowing non-cooperators with selective benefits that
would, all else being equal, outweigh those of the cooperators. There would thus be
strong selective pressures against such unconditional motivations, and the proliferation of
obligata through a population would seem to require some responsiveness to evidence of
whether others are cooperating and some kind of channeling of the self-sacrificing
behavior toward other fellow cooperators. The suppositions should, in other words,
involve a kind of default trust, but a kind that is nevertheless defeasible and responsive to
evidence of insufficient motivation.
But there should also be a corresponding ambiguity in the experience of a
failed supposition. Such an experience might be taken as (i) challenging the idea that all
(or a significant majority of) other relevant cooperators agree with our conception of the
right or of what is required—which might thus invite normative discussion, with the aim
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It is common to observe that human relations give rise to numerous social contract problems. See, e.g.,
Gauthier, supra note 82, at 98; SHAUN P. HARGREAVES HEAP & YANIS VAROUFAKIS, GAME THEORY 14955 (1995). John Rawls calls these circumstances the “circumstances of justice” and takes them to be
integral to much of our social and political lives. See RAWLS, supra note 65, at 127-28. Alan Fiske has
been developing a comprehensive theory of the basic modes in which we conduct our social life and
relations with one another, and all of which he considers to be modes of resolving problems of cooperation.
See, e.g., ALAN PAGE FISKE, STRUCTURES OF SOCIAL LIFE (1993).

Moreover, it would be difficult to explain how we might resolve social contract problems by
creating sanctions that function as security mechanisms, unless we had some capacity to resolve them
without such mechanisms. This is because systems of punishment and sanction are themselves typically
public goods, which thus also have the underlying structure of an n-person prisoners’ dilemma or social
contract problem. Security mechanisms such as these cannot fundamentally explain how we resolve social
contract problems, then, on pain of regress. For a good description of this problem, see Allan Gibbard,
Norms, Discussion, and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzles, 100 ETHICS 787, 797 (1990); see also Elizabeth
Anderson, Beyond Homo Economicus: New Developments in Theories of Social Norms, 29 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 170, 182-84 (2000). While a number of people have proposed resolutions to this problem, no
proposal has won widespread acceptance. Compare, e.g., Gibbard, supra, at 798 with Anderson, supra, at
181 (citing JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 132-33 (1989)); see also Philip Pettit, Virtus Normativa:
Rational Choice Perspectives, 100 ETHICS 725-55 (1990).
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of settling on common ground;121 as (ii) evidence that the person who was supposed to
perform the relevant commitment is insufficiently motivated;122 or, finally, as (iii)
evidence that the supposed “other” is not a candidate for full participation in the social
contract.123 When placed in tandem with our other evidence and beliefs, however, which
might help to disambiguate things a bit, these suppositions might nevertheless help us
identify these important situations.
To mark the ways in which the suppositions that go into obligata both run
ahead of the evidence and are in some ways recalcitrant to the evidence, it will be useful
to label the suppositions “normative suppositions.” These considerations provide the first
promised refinement to the definition proposed thus far—as set forth in element (iv)—
and clarify one set of ways in which these expectation-like states differ from ordinary
belief-like states and involve certain attitudes of unsecured, default trust. Normative
suppositions that function in these ways are part of the deep structure of morality and
law.
It is, moreover, important to recognize, even at this early stage of the
argument, that the various elements that go into obligata must be bound up together for
them to serve their proposed function. For consider the alternatives. If we were to have
the conditional motivations without the corresponding normative suppositions, then the
resolution of the social contract problem would never get off the ground because we
would never suppose the conditions to obtain that would call for us to fulfill our
individual obligations. Similarly, if we were to have the relevant normative suppositions
without the conditional motivations, none of us would be motivated to fulfill our
individual obligations in a committed way. Our normative suppositions would thus be
systematically invalidated, and the domain of others to whom we would deem ourselves
obligated would narrow in scope to none. Finally, if we were each to have the
conditional motivations and were to suppose all others to have them too, but were not to
suppose that all others suppose all others to have them—a mouthful, indeed!—then we
could not sustain the normative supposition that all others take themselves to be in the
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See generally Sections G and H, infra (elaborating how normative discussion works to produce
coordination over normative content).
122

See generally Sections D and E, infra (elaborating how we sometimes take deviations from norms as
evidence of non-cooperative motive and how we tend to react to such conclusions).
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As Peter Railton has noted: “It is a commonplace of anthropology that tribal peoples often have only
one word to name both their tribe and ‘the people’ or ‘humanity.’ Those beyond the tribe are not deemed
full-fledged people, and the sorts of obligations one has toward people do not fully apply with regard to
outsiders.” Railton, supra note 78, at 27 (noting also that modern morality is viewed as extending to
nothing short of the species). Gilbert Harman has similarly traced out a number of features of our ordinary
moral judgments that suggest we sometimes view people in different cultures or who are so far removed
from our basic moral outlook as improper objects for sincere moral claims. See, e.g., GILBERT HARMAN,
THE NATURE OF MORALITY (1977), reprinted in CONTRACTARIANISM/ CONTRACTUALISM, supra note 67, at
140-144. The same is often true in the law, where we typically view foreign persons to be bound by their
domestic laws, not ours—at least in most circumstances. There is, moreover, a great deal of psychological
literature confirming that we tend to cognize many social relations in terms of “in-group”/“out-group,” and
that the presence or absence of shared group identification has palpable effects on our levels of cooperative
motive. See, e.g, Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1014-16
(1995); Naomi Ellemers & Wendy Van Rikswijk, Identity Needs Versus Social Opportunities, 60 SOC.
PSYCHOL. Q. 52, 52 (1997).
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circumstances needed for their obligations to make claims on their individual conduct—
and the conventional enterprise would tend to unravel. Hence, just like an obligata
accompaniment of a larger musical performance, the various elements that constitute
obligata, and that remain fixed to a common content, must come together in a unitary
bundle if they are to serve their proposed function.
The initial step in recognizing the existence of obligata is thus to
acknowledge, first, that we sometimes solve social contract problems without security
mechanisms,124 and, second, that given our best naturalistic understanding of ourselves,
plausibility considerations speak in favor of our employment of these strange bundles of
coordinated motive and normative supposition—or at least something very much like
them—to achieve this otherwise ordinary social task.
D.

ARGUMENT FROM STABILITY CONDITIONS AND REACTIVE
ATTITUDES

The arguments presented thus far should not produce conviction
independently. They importantly do more than merely suggest that we have capacities to
resolve social contract problems based on the fact that these capacities would be
beneficial. They note, instead, that we seem to resolve a variety of social contract
problems quite naturally and then suggest on this basis, and on the basis of what we
would need to do this, that we likely have psychological capacities with a particular
structure. Still, these initial arguments are only preliminary, and their deeper importance
lies in how they set the stage for a much more decisive set of arguments for the existence
and function of obligata as proposed herein.
The method that will be used to illuminate these more decisive grounds is
simply to hypothesize the existence of obligata as adaptive attitudes that function by
allowing us to resolve social contract problems, and then to ask when such attitudes
would be evolutionary stable. The answer to this question will generate empirical
predictions about some of the other motivational and behavioral phenomena that we
should expect to accompany any genuine attitudes of this kind. An examination of our
moral and legal practices, in the context of the larger ethnographic and psychological
record, as well as a number of independently derived philosophical accounts of
obligation, can then be used to test the plausibility of the current proposal. This Section
turns to a core part of this task.
As it turns out, this methodology will be quite useful because obligata, as
thus far defined, appear to have a particular property, namely that of being evolutionarily
altruistic. Following Elliot Sober, a trait will be called “evolutionarily altruistic” if it
inclines an organism to act in ways that enhance the reproductive fitness of one or more
other organisms at some cost to the reproductive fitness of the individual bearing the
trait.125 Obligata might seem to do this because they function to resolve social contract
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See supra note 120 (collecting citations observing that human life is replete with social problems)
(noting that we must have a capacity to resolve such problems without security mechanisms).
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Sober says that “[i]n evolutionary biology, . . . the concept [of altruism] is applied to behaviors that
enhance the fitness of others at the expense to self.” Elliot Sober, Did Evolution Make Us Psychological
Egoists?, supra note 112, at 8.
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problems, which have the underlying structure of an n-person prisoners’ dilemma,126 and
because they therefore motivate behavior that is strictly dominated (in the language of
rational choice theory).127 Where the resolution of a social contract problem has adaptive
value, any ordinal payoff relations expressed by the rational choice theorist can be
rendered in terms of ordinal fitness consequences, and the motives to cooperate will turn
out to have evolutionarily altruistic properties as well. Now, there is a well known
problem with the stability of evolutionarily altruistic traits. All other things being equal,
the bearers of such traits will tend to do poorer in evolutionary time than their more
selfish counterparts. If applicable to obligata, this would mean that any bearers of
obligata with motives of a given strength would tend to do more poorly than any
counterparts with lesser, but non-neglible, motives. Over generations, the members who
were less motivated by the social contract would tend to do better, and obligata with any
notable strength would tend to slowly erase themselves from the natural world. This is a
well-known phenomenon that is commonly referred to as “subversion from within.”128
And the only constraint that has been placed on this subversion thus far is that a complete
absence of cooperative motivation will keep one from being a candidate for membership
in the social contract, and for the benefits that naturally flow therefrom. This constraint
still allows for the subversion of obligata with any notable strength, and, hence, for the
subversion of many if not most resolutions employing this psychological state.
There is, however, now a large body of literature on the conditions under
which traits with seemingly evolutionarily altruistic properties can evolve and remain
stable against subversion. Through the modern study of “replicator dynamics,” we can
model populations of self-replicating organisms that interact with one another and with
the world in certain well-defined recurrent situations, such as those having the structure
of a social contract problem, in accordance with a set of competing traits that define how
they will act in the given interactions.129 The expected fitness “payoffs” from the
modeled interactions can then be calculated, and relative payoffs can be used to
determine the percentage of “offspring” that each organism will leave to interact in
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The standard prisoners’ dilemma is a two-person a game. For a clear introduction to the standard
example, see Shaun Hargraves Heap, Game Theory, in HEAP ET AL., supra note 78, at 98-100. Prisoners’
dilemmas can, however, arise among larger groups of n persons, and an “n-person prisoners’ dilemma”
refers to any n-person game in which there is a cooperative equilibrium that is strictly dominated by an
alternative defecting equilibrium, and where rational utility maximizers would therefore lose the potential
cooperative benefits of resolving the dilemma if they were to act in accordance with this norm of
rationality.
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Rational choice theorists call a strategy “strictly dominated” if it is “never as good as another feasible
strategy, whatever the other player does.” Bruce Lyons, Game Theory, in HEAP ET AL., supra note 78, at
98. Acting in accordance with a cooperative equilibrium in a prisoners’ dilemmas is strictly dominated in
this sense. See id.
128

See Samir Okasha, Biological Altruism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2003),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/altruism-biological (noting use of this term and describing phenomenon);
see also RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 7-8 (new ed. 1989) (presenting general argument that
natural selection should be expected to weed out altruistic traits).
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For a useful introduction to replicator dynamics and evolutionary game theory, see Peter Hammerstein,
What is Evolutionary Game Theory?, in GAME THEORY AND ANIMAL BEHAVIOR 3-15 (Lee Alan Dugatkin
& Hudson Kern Reeve eds., 1998).
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accordance with its given trait in the next generation.130 The question whether a given
trait, with certain seemingly evolutionarily altruistic features, could evolve and persist as
an adaptation given the entry of certain near variants can then be reframed as the question
whether a pure population with that trait is a “Nash equilibrium” in the replicator
dynamics. To say that something is a “Nash equilibrium” is to say that interacting in
accordance with the particular equilibrium trait in a population dominated by that same
trait yields higher fitness benefits in that population than any of the other variants that are
modeled in the replicator dynamics.131 There can be multiple Nash equilibria, but any
strategy that meets this criterion is said to be “evolutionarily stable.”132
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It is common to begin by saying that, in the initial state of a system, there are n different strategies s1, . .
. , sn, which reflect different ways the bearers of the traits will interact in the relevant game theoretic
situations, and to denote the frequency of strategy Si as fi. See, e.g., id. at 5. Often, the relative payoffs
associated with playing the various strategies will be independent of the frequencies of the strategies. This
is not, however, always the case, and it will not typically be the case for the problems discussed here. To
capture the possible frequency-dependent aspects of these payoffs, it is common to define a vector that
represents the relative frequencies of each strategy, such as f = (f1, . . . , fn), and then to define the expected
fitness associated with playing strategy Si as ui(f). The mean expected fitness value of the population can,
finally, be represented as (f). Then the vector representation of the relative frequencies of each strategy in
a subsequent generation can be represented as f = (f 1, . . . , f n), and the value can be calculated with the
following equation (which is often called the “discrete replicator equation with frequency-dependent
fitness”):
f' = fi

ui(f)
(f)

for i = 1, . . . , n

Id. Quite often, iteration of this equation will yield one or more “Nash equilibria,” or vector states that
stabilize themselves and resist perturbation by increases or decreases of competing strategies once the
vector state has been reached. By applying this equation to a number of game theoretic that one might
plausibly think recurred in our environment of evolutionary adaptation, one can thus get a sense of which
strategies might have won out against others, beginning either with random populations or more limited
sets that reflect facts that we learn about our natural histories. The percentage of random populations that
statistically end up at one or another Nash equilibrium is commonly called the “basin of attraction” for that
equilibrium, and Nash equilibria with larger basins of attraction are, all other things equal, more likely
evolve in nature. See generally SKYRMS, supra note 113, at 14-16, 19-21 (describing basins of attraction
and how they operate in application to specific game theoretic problems).
The reader will be happy to know that the discussions in the main text will not require the
level of mathematical detail just canvassed.
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See, e.g., Lyons, supra note 127, at 101 (“A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies, one for each player,
such that given the strategies being played by others, no player can improve on her pay-off by adopting an
alternative strategy. This concept is so fundamental that it is often called simply the equilibrium point.”).
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The concept of an “evolutionary stable strategy” was first introduced by John Maynard Smith and G.R.
Price in The Logic of Animal Conflicts, 24 ANIMAL BEHAVIOUR 159-175 (1973). There are some variations
in how the term is used. Allan Gibbard says that an evolutionarily stable strategy is any “strategy such that
given the organism’s environment, which consists in part of the behavioral dispositions of other organisms,
its strategy is at least as fitness enhancing as any other strategy easily accessible by mutation.” Gibbard,
supra note 106, at 31, 35. Maynard Smith uses the term in a somewhat stronger sense and says that an
evolutionary stable strategy “is a strategy such that, if all members of a population adopt it, then no mutant
strategy could invade the population under the influence of natural selection.” JOHN MAYNARD SMITH,
EVOLUTION AND THE THEORY OF GAMES 10 (1982). Gibbard’s definition would add a useful dose of
realism and empirical plausibility to many applications of evolutionary game theoretic reasoning, but
nothing important hinges on these distinctions for present purposes.
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Notice that any trait meeting this criterion will not genuinely be
evolutionarily altruistic, in the final analysis, because—by some complex method or
other—the trait must be more advantageous to its bearer than any relevant alternative if it
is to be evolutionarily stable. Still, standing alone, the primary motives to act in
accordance with standards that resolve social contract problems are evolutionarily
altruistic for reasons already discussed; we must therefore look for other features of these
attitudes to identify what would stabilize them and make them lose this property in that
more complex form. When bound up with these other psychological phenomena, our
motives to act in accordance with morality and law would, however, still have a related
property that can be puzzling from an evolutionary perspective. They would be altruistic
in an adaptationist sense, which Cosmides and Tooby have recently clarified as follows:
An adaptationist definition of altruism would focus on whether there was a
highly nonrandom phenotypic complexity that is organized in such a way
that it reliably causes an organism to deliver benefits to others, rather than
on whether the delivery was costly. The existence of such a design
problem is the adaptationist problem of altruism—an evolutionary
“problem” requiring explanation whether that delivery is costly, cost-free
or even secondarily beneficial to the deliverer.133
The project here, then, is to identify evolutionary stability conditions for seemingly
evolutionarily altruistic parts of obligata, which conditions will reveal that obligata as a
whole are ultimately adaptive and are not evolutionarily altruistic. But to reach this
conclusion we must work through the puzzle of how obligata, as so far defined, might
arise and persist in nature, given that they seem to be evolutionarily altruistic.
Through the study of replicator dynamics, it has been shown that there are,
in fact, a number of discrete processes that can produce such traits. These are the
processes of kin selection,134 identification and discrimination,135 certain highly-specific
forms of geographical clustering forced by external circumstances,136 reciprocal
altruism137 and, arguably, certain forms of so-called “non-naïve” group selection that
ultimately depend upon mechanisms like highly-specific forms of geographical clustering

133

John Tooby & Leda Cosmides, Friendship and the Banker’s Paradox: Other Pathways to the
Evolution of Adaptations for Altruism, 88 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 119, 121 (1996).
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W.D. Hamilton is typically credited with clarifying that survival of the fittest operates on inclusive
fitness, which is “measured by its effect on survival and reproduction both of the organism bearing it, and
of the genes, identical by descent, borne by the organism’s relatives.” DOUGLAS FUTUYAMA,
EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY G-1 (3d ed. 1998) (emphasis added). This fact can be used to explain the
evolution of traits that are seemingly evolutionarily altruistic toward kin, and the mechanisms that produce
such traits have been called “kin selection.” See, e.g., DAWKINS, supra note 128, at 89-108.
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See, e.g., Kitcher, The Evolution of Human Altruism, supra note 110, at 497-516.
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See, e.g., Sober, Did Evolution Make Us Psychological Egoists?, supra note 112, at 8-27.
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See, e.g., ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (developing the concept of
“reciprocal altruism” and using computer modeling to show how certain forms of reciprocal altruism can
evolve and remain stable in nature).
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or identification and discrimination.138 In canvassing these and related possibilities,
Brian Skyrms has recently observed that positive correlation between evolutionary
altruists is the common feature that allows evolutionary forces to select for phenomena of
this kind.139 Although the mechanisms that ensure this correlation can be quite varied,
the correlation is what is mathematically significant in the replicator dynamics, and is
what gives all the mechanisms that we currently understand their ability to generate and
sustain cooperative equilibria.140
The reason that positive correlation captures something important in the
replicator dynamics is, however, that positive correlation helps ensure that any benefits of
a cooperative enterprise flow primarily to cooperators. A positive correlation is, in fact,
sufficient to allow for the evolution of cooperation only if the increased benefits that
cooperators obtain from their cooperative efforts due to the positive correlation are larger
than both the costs involved with cooperating and the benefits, if any, that noncooperators also obtain from the cooperative enterprise. But this suggests that what is
fundamental is not positive correlation itself but rather this relational property concerning
the distributions of evolutionary costs and cooperative benefits among cooperators and
non-cooperators. Where this distribution is not guaranteed by kin selective forces or by
mechanisms external to the group, this means that a basic stability condition of obligata is
that cooperators must share internal psychological mechanisms or capacities to identify
and exclude non-cooperators from the benefits of the cooperative enterprise, either by
preventing sufficient benefits from flowing to non-cooperators or by engaging in
precommitted and costly acts of punishment that will make non-cooperation sufficiently
costly. Obligata could remain evolutionarily stable, then, if—as set forth in element (v)
of the refined definition—the breach of normative suppositions were to trigger emotions
or other powerful impulses or attitudes that would function to identify and exclude noncooperators from the benefits of the social contract.
Once this evolutionary stability condition has been acknowledged, a
138

Group selectionist theories have generally fallen into disfavor, and are likely inconsistent with natural
selection. Most commentators agree that at minimum “the conditions necessary for [group selection] to
occur are quite stringent,” and the phenomenon is “quite rare”—if it exists at all. David L. Hull,
Introduction to Part III: Units of Selection, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIOLOGY 149, 149 (David L. Hull &
Michael Ruse eds., 1998). The leading modern proponents of a so-called “non-naïve” group selectionist
account of human altruism are Elliot Sober and David Sloan Wilson. See, e.g., ELLIOTT SOBER & SLOAN
WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998). Sober and
Wilson have identified a discrete set of circumstances in which so-called “non-naïve” group selection
purportedly operates. The circumstances in question are, however, ones that meet the more general
criterion for individual or gene-level selection to produce and stabilize traits with evolutionarily altruistic
properties that will be developed in the main text of this Article below. See infra note __ & accompanying
text. For the purposes of this Article, there is no reason to distinguish these circumstances from ordinary
instances of natural selection operating, and use of the term “group selection” to refer to these
circumstances here may actually lead to confusion.
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See SKYRMS, supra note 113, at 61. For a more in depth treatment of these issues, which shows how
positive correlation arises in these other settings, see Skyrms, supra note 113, at 503-28.
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See, e.g., id. at 525 (noting that correlated interactions “may be a consequence of a tendency to interact
with relatives (Hamilton’s kin selection), of identification and discrimination, of spatial location, or of
strategies established in repeated game situations (the reciprocal altruism of Trivers 1971 and Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981)”).
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wealth of considerations can be seen to speak in favor of the existence of obligata with
their proposed function. Beginning with the evidence from moral philosophy, Stephen
Darwall has, for example, recently emphasized that we cannot even begin to understand
the distinction between the normativity of moral obligations and those of other
purportedly categorical requirements, such as the requirements of logic or etiquette,
without conceding an intrinsic relation between obligations and others’ standing to
demand compliance, sometimes by invoking reactive attitudes or other forms of
permitted punishment or coercion for non-compliance.141 This kind of concession would
seem to entail that our attitudes and practices relating to moral obligation are inherently
bound up with the kinds of phenomena needed to stabilize obligata. In more or less
explicit form, this same kind of relation has, moreover, been recognized by a number of
previous philosophers reflecting merely on the structure of our moral practices and/or on
the meaning of our moral terms. Richard Brandt has, for example, listed among the
criteria by which a sociologist might recognize the ‘moral code’ of a society, not only
that (i) individuals have intrinsic motivations to respect the relevant moral imperatives
but also that (ii) individuals “think[] it proper that some degree of coercion be brought on
a person (perhaps only by the pressure of his own conscience) to induce the relevant form
of behaviour in him” and that (iii) actions contrary to the code are met with “guiltfeelings and disapproval.”142 John Stuart Mill has similarly analyzed moral obligation in
terms of moral wrongdoing, stating, famously, that: “We do not call anything wrong,
unless we mean to imply that a person ought to be punished in some way or other for
doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow creatures; if not by opinion, by the
reproaches of his own conscience.”143 And attitudes like these are, in fact, nothing other
than the reactive attitudes that Peter Strawson has famously shown to be central to our
ordinary concept of moral responsibility144 and—though the point is less frequently
noted—of moral obligation as well.145 All of these thinkers reached their respective
conclusions without the aid of the kind of evolutionary argumentation presented here, and
the coincidence of their results with the claims defended here on independent naturalistic
and theoretical grounds suggests that both sets of views do great justice to the truth.146
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For the classic exposition of this view, see P.F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, in STUDIES IN THE
PHILOSOPHY OF THOUGHT AND ACTION (P.F. Strawson ed., 1968).
145

In explanation of our tendency to inhibit the reactive attitudes towards persons who are deemed insane,
Strawson says, for example, that “to the extent to which the agent is seen in this light, he is not seen as one
on whom demands and expectations lie in that particular way in which we think of them as lying when we
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Drawing on a number of closely related evolutionary considerations, Allan Gibbard has also accounted
for what he calls “narrow” moral judgments as expressing attitudes of norm acceptance that govern
attitudes of guilt and impartial anger. See GIBBARD, supra note 111, at 23-82. Gibbard’s account posits a
psychology that is, in its basic contours, fully in line with the main thrust of the psychological claims
defended here. Though our psychological accounts differ in a number of important details, our views
converge significantly, at least at this level of abstraction. Many of Gibbard’s arguments and those
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In any event, further support for the claims defended here can be found if
we step back from accounts of moral obligation and look to related accounts of legal
obligation. In The Concept of Law, H.L.A. Hart has famously argued that when we use
the normative language that pervades our legal practices, we are typically giving
expression to rules that we accept “internally.” By this, he means that we not only take
the rules as internal guides to action but also view their breach as warranting criticism of
some sort.147 When we take up an internal attitude to moral and legal obligations, he later
says, moreover, that the commands they present us with “may be taken not only as [i] a
peremptory [exclusionary] guide to action by those who are themselves commanded to
act, but may be taken by them and others as [ii] a standard of evaluation of the conduct of
others as correct or incorrect right or wrong . . . and as [iii] rendering unobjectionable and
permissible what would normally be resented, that is demands for conformity, or various
forms of coercive pressure on others to conform, whether or not those others themselves
recognize the commands as peremptory reasons for their own actions.”148 These last
attitudes, along with their well known connection to practices of enforcement and
punishment, are just what would be needed to provide for the evolutionary stability
conditions of obligata, conceived as adaptations that function by allowing us to resolve
social contract problems.149
We can, finally, step back even further and find additional support for the
claims made here in the larger ethnographic and psychological record. Christopher
Boehm—a leading cultural anthropologist—has, for example, collected data on the social
structures common to many hunter-gatherer tribes and bands, whose social lives most
plausibly resemble ordinary human life during most of our environment of evolutionary
adaptation.150 His work suggests that such bands tend towards what he calls an
“egalitarian ethos,” with violations of egalitarian norms generating reactions of ridicule,
ostracism, physical sanctioning, exile, and sometimes even group killings of norm
violators.151 Indeed, moralistic aggression and anger at norm violations is a seemingly

presented here should thus be viewed as reciprocally reinforcing with regard to the psychological claims
defended.
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cross-cultural feature of human society,152 one which anthropologists have suggested
persists even through otherwise vast cultural differences and differences in the social and
political structures of societies.153 Moving from anthropology to psychology, there is,
moreover, now a growing body of evidence that we engage in costly forms of punishment
for non-cooperation in many public goods and prisoners’ dilemma situations.154 Whether
we approve of these facts about ourselves or not, they provide powerful support for the
claim that we share obligata and that they serve the function proposed here. Notice,
moreover, the form of the support: the account has yielded testable, empirical predictions,
which cohere with and find support in a wealth of the available data.
Let us return, then, to element (v) of the proposed definition. This element
posits mechanisms that function to identify and exclude non-cooperators from the
benefits of the cooperative enterprise, which are triggered, consequent upon any breach
of the normative suppositions. Viewed from an external standpoint, this is merely a
causal claim. But viewed from the perspective of the bearers of obligata, who in bearing
them take there to be reason to fulfill their respective obligations and to suppose others to
do the same, this refinement corresponds to the psychological fact that these same bearers
take there to be reason to react to deviations in certain ways and/or to permit what would
152
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including most modern ones. Honor codes may engage attitudes like obligata that functioned well for
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dysfunctional in many modern circumstances. One thing seems clear: absent attitudes of deference to
external authority to adjudicate these kinds of potentially escalating conflicts, honor codes can lead to much
that is wasteful and counterproductive.
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otherwise be resented, namely, certain forms of punishment or coercion for noncompliance. These are features that should be familiar from many of our normative
practices, and are—on the present view—parts of the deep structure of morality and law.
In addition, we can now specify the relationship between the perceived
reasons to act that arise from obligata and those that arise from the broad class of desires
assumed at the beginning this argument.155 The function of obligata is to resolve social
contract problems that arise in light of these ordinary desires. To fulfill this role, obligata
must therefore provide us with sufficient motivation to counteract at least some of those
desires. Corresponding to this motivational fact are several phenomenological ones
concerning how obligations should appear to us in first person deliberation. First, we
should expect that we would perceive obligations to have the standing to override or
exclude at least some reasons arising from desire or personal interest. This is, in fact,
precisely the standing that Raz has referred to in arguing that moral and legal imperatives
provide us with “exclusionary” reasons to act.156 Second, we should expect that we will
perceive obligations as providing us with reasons that are in some sense irreducible to our
antecedent desires or interests and arise from rules that apply to us regardless of
antecedent desire or interest. These are, in fact, parts of the ordinary intuitions we have
when we think that moral and legal obligations to have a peculiar binding nature or
categorical force.157
Of course, it is probably more phenomenologically accurate to suggest
that obligata function along with our other ordinary beliefs and desires in a way that
renders action in accordance with morality and law less conscious and more habitual in
many circumstances. For example, most of us probably do not even think about things
like murdering people in order to obtain things that we desire. Obligata would
nevertheless serve their function perfectly well if, when placed in conjunction with other
psychological mechanisms of habituation, they were to provide us with what we took to
be sufficient reasons to act. With these caveats in mind, we should nevertheless include
the (vi) exclusionary force of the reasons that morality and law provide us with as part of
the deep structure of morality and law.
Before continuing, it is, finally, worth pausing for a moment to clarify the
sense in which obligata are and are not altruistic. The arguments thus far have suggested
that while obligata are not strictly speaking evolutionarily altruistic, they do incline us to
act in ways that regularly confer evolutionary benefits on others and to do so at what
would—absent the stabilizing reactive attitudes—regularly induce evolutionary costs to
ourselves. This does not yet speak to the question of whether obligata incline us to act in
ways that are psychologically altruistic.
The question whether an action is
psychologically altruistic is one concerning the type of motive from which one acts, and
whether—for example—one acts out of concern for others or to procure one’s own
interests, regardless of whatever evolutionary costs or benefits the act might otherwise
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have.158 In fact, however, many of the motives that go into obligata in us would appear to
be neither psychologically altruistic nor psychologically selfish. They are better
characterized as deontological attitudes, which allow us to take the perceived fact that
something is right or required as a sufficient reason to act.159 Acting on such reasons
may require us to do things that we can understand, from another perspective, as
involving self-sacrifice or as conducing to the benefit of others, but these considerations
need not be our own reasons for action if we are instead acting out of a sense of duty.
These points are important to bear in mind because much of the existing literature on the
evolution of the moral sentiments is focused on the issue of altruism, and does not always
appreciate the degree to which psychologically deontological, rather than psychologically
altruistic, motives sustain our moral and legal practices.
E.

ARGUMENT FROM THE STANDARD EXCUSES

At this point, a third set of considerations that speak in favor of the view
that we use obligata to respond to obligations can be brought to light. The last section
argued that phenomena like the reactive attitudes would allow natural selection to
stabilize obligata with a given equilibrium strength of motivation. Hence, if we were to
have well-functioning obligata, which give life to a system of obligations, we might
expect to find some evidence in our normative practices of sensitivities to a particular
distinction. This is the distinction between failures to act in accordance with directives
that genuinely reveal insufficient motivation—as assessed by this equilibrium standard—
and failures that do not. Only failures that genuinely reveal insufficient motivation
should be deemed evidence of non-cooperation.160 And while a sensitivity to this
distinction is not a general evolutionary stability condition for obligata, there would be
clear adaptive value to the sensitivity. It would allow the bearers of obligata to refrain
from wrongly excluding genuine cooperators whose conduct nevertheless seems, on its
face, to be in breach. Hence, if we see some sensitivity to this distinction in our
normative practices——perhaps even a growing sensitivity in the course of human
history—these facts will provide further grounds for the claims defended thus far.
Reflection on a number of general facts about us and the world we live in
will, moreover, allow us to identify a number of regular and expectable situations that
158
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would cause any of us to fail to fulfill a directive without revealing a relevant
motivational problem. These would include failures deriving from things like mistaken
beliefs, the unforeseen consequences of our actions, the physical impossibility of
fulfilling a commitment in a particular set of circumstances, momentary losses of control
that would affect other ordinary persons just the same, and/or internal or external forces
that simply outweigh the required equilibrium strength of motivations to comply. In fact,
we are all familiar with practices of excuse-making that respond to just these situations.
In our periodic recognition of the familiar excuses of mistake, accident, impossibility,
incapacity, loss of control (sometimes dubbed irrationality or insanity), force, duress and
necessity, we see sensitivities to the exact distinction in question.
This sensitivity is, moreover, pervasive in precisely the sense needed to
support the claims in this Article. Richard Brandt has identified just these excusing
conditions as playing a critical role not only in commonsense morality but in the criminal
law;161 and H.L.A. Hart has “draw[n] attention to the analogy between conditions that are
treated by criminal law as excusing conditions and certain similar conditions that are
treated in []other branch[es] of the law as invalidating certain civil transactions such as
wills, gifts, contracts, and marriages.”162 Writing at a time that many believe to reflect
ethical values that are in many ways deeply inconsistent with our own,163 Aristotle
nevertheless identified the very same set of excuses and argued that they are an intrinsic
part of human ethical practices, which can be used to give content to the conception of
responsibility or voluntariness that we use in these practices164—a tack that J.L. Austin
took up much more recently, adverting, once again, to the very same excusing
conditions.165 Finally, while there is some debate as to whether ancient or so-called
“primitive” legal and moral systems have allowed for these excuses—or have allowed for
them to the same degree—some range in sensitivity is consistent with the claims
developed here because our capacity to recognize the standard excuses contributes to the
stability of our normative practices, on the present view, but is not a strict evolutionary
stability condition. In any event, in his famous studies of primitive law, Oliver Wendell
Holmes has suggested that even in the systems of vengeance, or laws of the blood feud,
that characterized early Roman law and the laws of the Germanic tribes before the rise of
the common law, only wrongful actions that were perceived as intentional were
avenged;166 and Frans de Waal, a prominent primatologist, has observed that a focus on
distinguishing between deliberate and accidental actions is prominent even in the greater
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primate line.167 Perhaps, then, there is some truth to Holmes’s famous observation that
“even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being kicked.”168 If there is
a distinction here between modern societies and so-called “primitive” societies, it would
thus appear to be a matter of degree, not kind.
There is, however, an important objection that one might raise at this
point. As described, the present account might seem to suggest that morality and law
would limit liability to voluntary transgressions, but there are obvious counterexamples to
this claim. Tort law is, for example, a full and thriving branch of Anglo-American law,
and one of its central features is to impose duties on us to compensate one another for
certain harmful accidents.169 Similar compensatory intuitions can be found in
commonsense morality as well.170 Any appearance of inconsistency can nevertheless be
dispelled by carefully distinguishing between the different kinds of rules that operate in
these different areas of our normative practice. The discussions thus far—about the
reactive attitudes and standard excusing conditions—apply to the criminal law and its
near analogues in morality and law, wherever the rules in question lay direct claims on
our conduct. It would, however, be a mistake to try to reduce too many of our normative
practices to this simple model.171 Hart, for example, argues forcefully that the law
contains at least one other deeply important class of rules, which he calls “powerconferring rules.”172 These are not rules that primarily lay direct claims on our conduct,
but rather ones that give us the power to vary our normative relations with one another
and to create, modify or extinguish a number of important social relations and
enterprises.173 The law of contracts, marriage, wills and probate are familiar examples of
this phenomenon, though commonsense morality contains numerous examples as well.174
In my view, many of the rules of tort law represent yet another distinguishable class of
rules, which might be called “liability-conferring rules.” These are rules that do not,
strictly speaking, tell us not to engage in any particular conduct, but they do tell us to be
careful and to compensate others for certain losses occasioned by our accidents. 175
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Once these distinctions have been granted, the objection in question can be
shown to be inappropriately focused. The perceived strength of the objection derives
from the fact that many power- and liability-conferring rules appear to reflect resolutions
to social contract problems, although the breach of these rules does not typically mark
one out for exclusion in the sense needed to stabilize obligata. But power- and liabilityconferring rules are importantly different from rules that lay primary claims on our
conduct, and, when they resolve social contract problems, they do so in part because they
are bound up with rules of this more basic kind.176 These more basic rules typically
require us either to perform certain acts or pay damages for the breach of contractual and
related norms.177 They typically require us to compensate others for harms we have
occasioned in the case of accidents or unintentional torts, or—in the case of genuine strict
liability—in some cases of harm where there is no fault at all.178 The present account
would thus predict that it is these rules that require stabilization, and this prediction is, in
fact, borne out by the evidence.
For example, while expectation damages provide the most common
remedy for contractual breaches in Anglo-American law, courts have sanctioning powers
that they will employ to bring parties who intentionally refuse to pay civil damages
awards into compliance.179 Courts have similar powers to bring tortfeasors into
compliance.180 Corresponding to these legal facts are important facts about analogous
moral situations: acts of apology and rectification for harms one has caused will tend to
assuage moral aggression or hold it in abeyance, while intentional refusals to act in
conciliatory manners will tend to provoke real ire.181 In any event, punitive damages
sometimes arise in tort law, and even—to a much lesser extent—in the law of contracts.
They typically arise when, but only when, someone causes harm with the kind of mens
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rea ordinarily needed for criminal liability,182 and this is precisely the shape that this
account would predict our normative practices to take. Finally, further support for the
present view could be found if the standard excuses were to creep back into our
normative practices in response to these less common punitive reactions. This would
appear to be the case: in both morality and law, we distinguish between the person who
intentionally refuses to comply with a known duty to compensate and the person who has
an excuse for failing to pay on time.183
Rather than undermining the present account, facts like these thus help
show how it might unravel another puzzle about our normative practices. In particular,
while standards of strict liability often crop up in tort law, there is a very strong
presumption in the criminal law that some mens rea is required for criminal liability.184
As one court has suggested:
In the criminal arena, there is . . . a very strong presumption that some
mental state is required for culpability. This requirement, which
distinguishes those who perform acts knowingly, intentionally, or
recklessly from those who perform them by accident or mistake, is “as
universal and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of
the human will and a consequent ability and duty of the normal individual
to choose between good and evil.”185
But as compelling as this principle is in the criminal context, there are large areas of tort
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law where the principle does not control.186 This fact should be puzzling on its face,
but—for the foregoing reasons—the present account would predict this distinction.
These facts thus provide another set of considerations that support the
psychological views defended here. It would go beyond the scope of this Article to try to
detail all of the ways the standard excuses operate in our moral and legal practices. The
foregoing discussions should nevertheless clarify important ways in which they pervade
these practices, and—so long as the proposition is understood to admit of further
refinements like these—the pervasiveness of the standard excuses should be considered a
part of the deep structure of morality and law.

F.

ARGUMENT FROM AGENT-CENTEREDNESS

One objection that might be raised at this point is that the account is at
odds with the “agent-centeredness” of commonsense morality and the law. Following
standard convention, a requirement will be called “agent-centered” if, in at least some
circumstances, it purports to give each person a different aim or goal, namely that he or
she fulfill a given requirement even if by failing to do so that person could cause two or
more others to fulfill the requirement in equally weighty circumstances.187 A
requirement will be called “agent-neutral” if, instead, it gives all people the same aims or
goals.188 A person who is under an agent-centered requirement not to break promises
will, for example, sometimes be required not to break her own promises even if by doing
so she might prevent two or more others from breaking theirs in equally weighty
circumstances. A person who is under an agent-neutral requirement prohibiting promisebreaking would, by contrast, be required to minimize instances of promise-breaking—
regardless of who the relevant promise breakers are. This agent-neutral requirement
would not only allow but also require people to break their own promises if by doing so
they could prevent two or more others from breaking promises in equally weighty
circumstances.
As the last example illustrates, many imperatives can be stated in ways
that leave them ambiguous as to whether they are agent-centered or agent-neutral.
Properly construed, commonsense morality and the law are, however, replete with agentcentered restrictions.189 This fact might be thought to pose a problem for the present
account for a simple reason: some social contract problems can seemingly be resolved by
186

See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 178, § 392, at 1097-98 (strict liability in workers’ compensation); id. §
346, at 950-52 (strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity); id. § 334, at 905-06 (employer liability
for torts of employees).
187

See, e.g., PARFIT, supra note 102, at 27, 54-55; SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF
CONSEQUENTIALISM 80 (1982) (explaining that a theory will contain an agent-centered restriction if “there
is some restriction S, such that it is at least sometimes impermissible to violate S in circumstances where
doing so would prevent a still greater number of equally weighty violations of S, and would have no other
morally relevant consequences”); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 73 (1993). It
is widely accepted that common sense morality is pervaded by agent-centered restrictions, though some
have argued that the authority of such restrictions is problematic.
188

189

See, e.g., PARFIT, supra note 102, at 27, 54-55.
See, e.g., Stephen Darwall, Introduction, in DEONTOLOGY 1-7 (Stephen Darwall ed., 2003).

43

adopting broad agent-neutral standards, which give each member of the relevant social
contract a shared aim or goal. “Act for the common good” would be one such plausible
standard, and a number of economists, including Richard Posner, have argued that
adopting a fundamentally contractarian decision procedure will, in fact, result in a
standard that requires us to maximize efficiency or pareto-optimal states of affairs.190
This standard is agent-neutral; yet commonsense morality and the law have a different
face to them, and their standards typically permit us to refrain from some actions that
would otherwise be efficient or tend to the common good.191 Indeed, this is a central
feature of their binding nature, a fact that David Hume famously observed and illustrated
with the following example: the miser who owns a bit of property to which he attaches no
real value is still typically viewed as morally and legally entitled to its recovery, even if
someone who has taken it would enjoy it more.192 More generally, the fact that a given
piece of property is mine or yours, that a given promise is mine or yours, and the like, can
make an important moral and legal difference—one which cannot be accounted for in
purely agent-neutral terms. If morality and law engage attitudes that naturally function to
allow us to resolve social contract problems, then why do they purport to present us with
so many relatively simple agent-centered restrictions rather than a broad agent-neutral
standard that in fact resolves social contract problems?
This challenge is certainly not decisive. Evolutionary dynamics do not
typically produce optimal results, and many of the simpler rules of action that we find in
morality and law do in fact resolve social contract problems. Hence, while broader,
agent-neutral standards like “act for the common good” might appear optimal in theory, a
supporter of the views developed here might try to account for the agent-centered
features of morality and law as arising from evolutionary suboptimalities. This line of
response would, however, be unsatisfying—or at least incomplete—in light of the
pervasiveness of simple, agent-centered restrictions in morality and law.
A more penetrating response would show that even perfect capacities to
resolve social contract problems would leave us perceiving ourselves under a multiplicity
of simpler rules for action that are agent-centered in form. The literature on rule
utilitarianism helps with one part of this project. It suggests why, even if our shared aim
or goal were to maximize utility impartially assessed, sharing a maxim with that content
190
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would likely be less optimal than internalizing simpler rules that have a more familiar
moral and legal look.193 Richard Brandt has collected the most commonly cited examples
of this phenomenon. First, it can be difficult to apply the utilitarian calculus, thus making
it likely that simpler standards for action, which take into account our limited intelligence
and other cognitive weaknesses, will maximize utility.194 Second, people tend to
rationalize in their own favor. Hence, concrete standards that allow for less judgment in
application can better serve the common good than broad standards, which are
ambiguous as to what they rule out.195 Third, we must often act quickly, and without
time for adequate deliberation. Deliberation can also be costly. Hence, relatively simple
rules—which give us specific directions in recurrent and readily-identifiable situations—
can sometimes conduce to the common good better than a general utilitarian standard.
Fourth, the collective following of an act utilitarian standard can be self-defeating, and
we sometimes need to coordinate to achieve the common good. At times, simpler
coordination rules are thus our most direct route to the common good.196 Finally, it is
often complained that broad utilitarian standards impose oppressive demands on us and
leave too little room for individual freedom to pursue our own ends.197 A certain sphere
of autonomous choice may be needed to allow us to achieve personal happiness, an
important ingredient of the common good.198
The psychological arguments presented thus far suggest a further,
underappreciated reason why, on the present assumptions, we might expect our moral and
legal codes to contain a multiplicity of simpler rules for action. Proponents of broad
consequentialist maxims like “act for the common good” typically view the question of
how to act and how to react to deviations from moral and legal norms as separable
questions.199 There are, however, familiar costs associated with punishing deviations
from norms, and it is certainly not the case that punishing every action that fails to live up
to an act utilitarian standard would maximize utility.200 In proposing broad agent-neutral
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standards for action, consequentialists like Derek Parfit are thus forced to try to define
normative categories like those of “blameless wrongdoing.”201 The arguments in this
Article suggest, however, that obligata are portfolios of primary motive and reactive
attitude, which come together as part of a distinctive syndrome. Indeed, the suggestion is
that these elements must come together for obligata to arise and persist in nature—and,
moreover, that we need obligata to identify and respond to moral and legal obligations. It
is therefore unclear whether the identification of categories like “blameless wrongdoing”
can hold our attention in the right way to reflect practicable normative proposals. At the
very least, it will continue to be a centrally important—and perhaps the most important
and pressing—normative question to determine what is right, and what wrong, where
these terms are used in their familiar senses, as entailing both that we have exclusionary
reasons to act and reasons to react to deviations in the ways discussed here.202 But this
means refusing to separate these questions in central areas of normative inquiry, and
instead focusing on which binding moral or legal rules would conduce to the common
good. There is a large literature in the rule utilitarian tradition the answer to this question
is a multiplicity of standards for action that are very much like the ones we commonly
find in morality and law.203
These considerations provide a first step to answering the puzzle that
began this section, but they do not go all the way. They suggest why, on the present
assumptions, we might expect morality and law to contain a multiplicity of relatively
simple and familiar rules for action, rather than broad consequentialist mandates. But
they do not explain why these simpler rules would appear in an agent-centered rather than
agent-neutral form. The proposed explanation for simple rules is that they sometimes
conduce to certain goals we might agree to share, in order to resolve various social
contract problems, and sometimes do so better than direct mandates to seek those goals.
If acting in accordance with simple rules like these will have these consequences,
however, then why would our moral and legal practices not allow us to violate these rules
if we could thereby prevent two or more others from engaging in equally weighty
violations? Legal and moral obligations often prohibit us from acting in this way, and
this is the deeper puzzle that their agent-centeredness poses for the present account.204
surprising. For what someone wants to do there is (at least normally) some benefit in permitting: he will
enjoy doing it, and feel frustrated in being prevented on grounds of conscience. If something is to be
prohibited or enjoined, a case must be made out for the long-range benefit of restricting the freedom of
individuals, making them feel guilty, and utilizing the teaching resources of the community.” BRANDT,
supra note 5, at 293.
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The appearance that there is an inconsistency here might nevertheless be
dispelled by attending to the distinctive epistemological difficulties we typically face
when applying agent-neutral as opposed to agent-centered standards to the facts. On the
present assumptions, these difficulties should affect not only our first personal
deliberation when deciding what to do but also our second personal deliberation when
deciding how to react to one anothers’ apparent deviations.205 Moreover—and this is
key—it will typically be much easier to identify breaches of a norm in its agent-centered
rather than its agent-neutral form. This is because there is only one relevant causal link
between an agent and an action required of her by an agent-centered standard, whereas
the causal links between an agent and the sum total of acts by anyone of a particular type
can be very long, very complex, and very difficult—if not impossible—to ascertain. To
illustrate with the familiar example that began this section, it will typically be much
easier to determine whether a person has broken her own promise than whether a person
has acted in a way that causes fewer promises to be kept. This point is, moreover,
generalizable, either fully or to a very significant degree. Rather than providing a
counterexample to the present psychological account, the deeply agent-centered nature of
morality and law is thus a feature that contributes to their stability on the present
assumptions.
These last arguments will, moreover, apply with even greater strength if—
as is more plausible—evolutionary forces have left us with merely suboptimal
psychological capacities to resolve social contract problems, which incline us to share
rules that conduce to the common good rather than maximizing it. These arguments will
similarly apply if—as a number of people have argued very plausibly—the resolution of
certain social contract problems is not one broad consequentialist standard but rather a
number of simpler shared standards for action that are more familiar from morality and
law.
These considerations thus allow for the final promised refinement of our
definition of obligata—as set forth in element (vii). For while the initial definition of
obligata began with a seemingly epistemic notion of suppositions—which were merely
suppositions that all (or a significant majority of) others are relevantly committed—this
more complex functional state is better characterized as involving suppositions of each
relevant individual that he or she will fulfill a standard, which normative supposition is
exhibited in us in tendencies to hold others accountable, to make claims on their conduct,
to criticize deviations, to resent what they have done to us, and the like.206 To serve their
function well, these attitudes will also need to focus us on relatively simple rules for
action that are agent-centered in form, and these features of morality and law should thus
also be understood as part of their deep structure.
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G.

SPECIAL NORMATIVE TERMINOLOGY

Consider an important admission that Joseph Raz has made. Although a
staunch legal positivist, he concedes that: “One of the main stumbling blocks for legal
positivists has been the use of normative language, i.e., the very same terminology which
is used in moral discourse, in legal discourse. The fact that the law is described and
analysed in terms of duties, obligations, rights and wrongs, etc., has long been regarded
by many as supporting the claim of the natural lawyer that law is inescapably moral.”207
One of the central problems in moral theory is, in fact, to determine what we might even
mean when we use this special terminology and make claims about things like
“obligations” or that a given action is “right” or “wrong.”208 To many, it seems
implausible that we could be referring to objective properties with this language, at least
if the properties are to have the prescriptivity or intrinsic motivational force that
obligations purportedly have.209 For how could properties of this kind exist in the natural
world?210 Moreover, even if such properties were to exist—say, in some non-natural
realm—it should seem equally puzzling how we might have epistemological access to
this realm, or how these non-natural properties might causally interact with us so as to
produce reliable knowledge.211
One might think the law is importantly different in this regard because the
law arises wholly from social conventions. There are now a number of plausible
accounts of social facts in terms of social conventions, which render these facts wholly
unmysterious and consistent with a broadly naturalistic worldview.212 One might thus try
to account for legal facts—e.g., facts about whether we have certain “legal obligations,”
or whether certain actions are “legally permitted” or “legally required”—on this same
basic model. Such an account would not only vindicate our common intuition that there
can be facts of the matter about what the law requires but would do so without requiring
us to posit any strange, non-natural moral properties or implausible epistemological
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capacities. The modern tradition of legal positivism can, in fact, be viewed as in large
part an attempt to make good on this basic promise.213
It has nevertheless proven notoriously difficult for legal positivists to
account for certain facts about adjudication in these terms. Our practices of adjudication
appear to allow for fundamental disagreement over the criteria that allow us to identify
the law, but disagreement of this particular kind is inconsistent with the claim that we
identify the law by using a social convention in the sense employed by most legal
positivists. 214 Whether legal positivists can plausibly accommodate these features of
adjudication into their accounts of the law—or can otherwise establish that these facts
have no genuine relevance to the inquiry—is an outstanding question for legal theory.215
Even if the legal positivists were to succeed, however, it would remain puzzling why the
law—now viewed as an institution that is distinguishable from morality in part because
we use a social convention to identify the law—would employ the same special
vocabulary as morality. How might one account for whatever is the same about the
meanings of these special terms as they arise in morality and law?
One promising approach to trying to account for our moral language is to
begin with the question of what psychological state we are in when we sincerely believe
we are under under a moral obligation, and then to account for the meaning of our special
moral terminology as in some sense expressive of these psychological states.216 If the
sincere expression of terms like “ought,” “obligation,” “duty,” “right,” and the like were
expressive of obligata, then—for reasons already discussed—this fact would explain
why, in both morality and law, the thought that one has an “obligation” is typically taken
to entail that one has a sufficient and agent-centered reason to fulfill that obligation. This
proposal would also explain why we taken reasons arising from obligations as capable of
excluding others that arise from antecedent desire or personal interest, and why we take
failure to fulfill such obligations as warranting certain forms of reaction and/or
punishment or coercion for non-compliance.217 The structural complexity of obligata
would—on this view—distinguish the thought that something is an obligation from the
213

See, e.g., HART, supra note 5, at 79-123, 254-59 (accounting for rule of recognition in terms of social
conventions); Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 243 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996) (stating that inclusive legal positivists
assert that “what norms count as legal norms in any particular society is fundamentally a matter of social
conventions”); Jules Coleman, Legal Positivism Since H.L.A. Hart (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) (noting that this is the general feature that unites modern positivist theories).
214

For an exemplary discussion of these problems and of the current state of the debate by a legal positivist,
see Coleman, supra note 213.

215

See id.

216

This basic pattern of analysis is called an “expressivist” analysis. Allan Gibbard has, for example,
proposed an expressivist analysis of rationality as follows: “To call something rational is not to attribute
some particular property to that thing—not even the property of being permitted by accepted norms. . . .We
explain the term by saying what state of mind it expresses.” GIBBARD, supra note 111, at 7-8, see also id.
at 45-48.
217

See, e.g., MILL, supra note 143, at 193 (“We do not call anything wrong unless we mean to imply that a
person ought to be punished in some way or other for doing it; if not by law, by the opinion of his fellow
creatures; if not by opinion, by the reproaches of his own conscience.”).

49

mere thought that we have a reason to act that arises from various things we desire or
conduce to personal interest. There may, of course, be a further fact—which legal
positivists have perhaps rightly latched onto—concerning the distinctive role that social
conventions play in identifying valid legal but not moral requirements, but none of this
would undermine the power of the present account to illuminate why morality and law
share the same special vocabulary.
The special normative vocabulary that morality and law share arises in a
number of different contexts. Sometimes we use it to discuss what the law is or what
morality requires, to tell stories with various morals, or to gossip about one anothers’
transgressions.218 Another important use of this language is, however, to address one
another second-personally with claims or grievances.219 When we do this, we are
charging one another with having done something wrong or against the law. But to do
something “wrong” or “against the law” in this sense, one must not only perform an act
that is “wrong” or “against the law” as these terms appear less charged contexts. One
must also do so in a way that reveals we are improperly motivated by morality or law.
As earlier discussions have suggested, our second personal attitudes towards one another
should have precisely these features: obligata consist in part of reactive attitudes that fund
our second-personal reactions and claims against one another, and some responsiveness
to the standard excuses should be an expected part of the deep structure of these attitudes.
The fact morality and law share the additional special normative vocabulary of
“standing,” “claim,” “charge,” “complaint,” “grievance,” “excuse,” “justification” and
the like would thus be well explained by citing structural features of the attitudes that
give morality and law their common life. The special normative vocabulary that morality
and law share should thus—on the present account—be viewed as yet another one of
their deep structural features.
Before continuing, an important clarification is in order. The general tack
of trying to account for aspects of the meanings of our moral terms as expressive of
various psychological attitudes has historically been associated with so-called “noncognitive” accounts of this language, which deny that moral judgments can be true or
false.220 More recent theorists like Allan Gibbard and Simon Blackburn have, however,
developed expressivist accounts of moral language that accommodate many of its
objectivist features, including the way we meaningfully disagree, the way we embed
moral language into conditionals, the way we draw inferences from moral premises to
moral conclusions, and the fact that our moral language supervenes on natural facts.221
These so-called “quasi-realists” have adopted a “minimalist” account of truth,222 and have
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suggested that there may be no property of truth that our descriptive judgments can have
that our moral judgments must lack.223 Quasi-realists nevertheless still deny that there is
any objective property of rightness that might explain our moral judgments,224 and it is
therefore important to recognize that this Article neither endorses nor rejects such claims.
As with the case of concepts like “desirable” and “good,” there is still room, in my view,
for reasonable disagreement on this issue. The question whether there are objective
properties that might explain our moral or legal judgments will likely depend on two
things: (i) whether we can settle on a normatively satisfying account of what is required
of us by morality or law; and (ii) whether the correct evolutionary explanation of our
capacities for normative judgment shows that they function to identify the natural facts
upon which these requirements supervene.225 It would go beyond the scope of this
Article to try to answer these questions here, but it is important to recognize that these
questions have been left open.

H.

ESSENTIAL CONTESTABILITY AND CONTENT

Up until this point, everything that has been said would, in principle, be
consistent with the view that natural selection has endowed us with certain natural and
inescapable views on right and wrong, which allow us to resolve discrete classes of social
contract problems that we faced recurrently in ancestral circumstances. A number of
people working in evolutionary game theory, such as Brian Skyrms and Robert Sugden,
have, in fact, recently begun to suggest specific game theoretic explanations for the
emergence of particular norms, such as those of private property.226 There is also some
evidence that certain normative commitments appear broadly, and cross-culturally, in
human life. Hart, for example, once suggested that while the moral and legal codes in
if and only if P.” See, e.g., Alfred Tarski, The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of
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particular societies can vary a great deal, there is still a set of minimal normative
commitments that all societies share, which he identifies as containing norms for the
“protection of persons, property and promises.”227 Hart says that “[s]uch rules do in fact
constitute a common element in the law and conventional morality of all societies which
have progressed to the point where these are distinguished as different forms of social
control.”228
For a number of reasons, however, it would appear to be a mistake to view
the contents of our sense of obligation as hard-wired at the level of content. As an initial
matter, it must be conceded that for any given candidate universal norm, there is genuine
controversy over its claim to cultural universality.229 To the extent that cultures converge
on specific kinds of norms, a close examination often reveals that there are numerous and
noteworthy distinctions between the precise content and status of these norms in different
cultural settings. For example, for those who think that practices of contract and
promise-keeping are absolutely central to human social life, Marcel Mauss’s classic work
The Gift is instructive because it indicates that in many so-called “primitive” societies,
goods have rarely been exchanged by means of explicit contracts or other reciprocal
promises in market transactions. 230 Goods have instead typically been exchanged by
means of intricate systems of reciprocal gift-giving, in which the owners of property are
viewed as obliged to give gifts to those with whom they associate, thereby generating a
shared sense of obligation to reciprocate.231 The conditions under which violence is
tolerated (and sometimes even expected) is also something that can differ quite vastly
from culture to culture—as anthropological studies of aggression have shown.232
Sometimes, finally, the surface universality of a candidate norm lies at a level of
generality that is one step removed from its precise content. If, for example, property
norms are defined in the paradigm case as norms that give individuals or collective
227
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bodies various bundles of rights to use, to exclude others from the use, and/or to transfer
certain goods,233 then every culture probably has property norms of some sort, which
more or less closely resemble this paradigm, but cultures differ so radically over what
goods can be acquired, what precise bundles of rights come with the acquisition, and how
specific property rights are created, varied, limited, extinguished and apportioned among
individuals or groups that the search for universal property norms would appear to be in
vain.234
Of course, the fact that there are controversies over the universality of any
given normative commitment does not mean that there is no fact of the matter, and one
might try to resolve some of this initial class of problems in favor of a narrower set of
core normative commitments that are in fact universal in the relevant sense. Still, even if
there is some such set, the ethnographic record displays such a surprisingly wide array of
norms in our moral and legal codes235 that the set of remnant commonalities—if indeed
there are any—clearly comprises a very small, and arguably negligible, portion of our
normative practices.
There is, moreover, another important reason to think that even universal
human agreement in views about the right would not render these views inescapable, one
which relates more centrally to the logic and nature of our normative practices. When we
accept propositions about what is right, we sometimes express our acceptance by making
judgments that prescribe certain courses of action or conduct. It is a well-known fact,
236
however—at least since G.E. Moore framed his famous “open question” argument —
that when we make such judgments, we can always meaningfully ask whether the actions
237
or courses of conduct that we disapprove of are, genuinely, wrong.
Related to this is
another well-known fact: for any moral judgment that we make, it is always possible for
238
others coherently and meaningfully to disagree with the assessment.
Where there is
the possibility of disagreement, it is plausible to think that there is the possibility of
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persuasion or conversion.
Indeed, modern psychological research suggests that we are
sometimes subject to persuasion or conversion of this kind in contexts of discussion with
perceived peers, even sometimes when those changes are not traceable to reasons that we
240
antecedently accept.
Our moral and legal judgments are thus apparently essentially
contestable, even if widely or universally shared, and this essential contestability is an
ineliminable feature of the attitudes we express with these judgments. Moreover, even if
there were universal agreement that a given action were morally or legally required, this
fact could alone not establish that the action was required on pain of regress, because it is
at best an open question whether the fact of convergence bears on any particular moral or
legal question.
One could, on the other hand, explain the full range of facts under
discussion by positing that we have obligata that allow us to resolve social contract
problems in a flexible manner. This particular kind of flexibility would allow for the
cultural variation we see in moral and legal views.241 This explanation would, moreover,
explain equally well why our ethnographic record exhibits certain recurrent and common
normative commitments. 242 There are a number of familiar problems that we face in
human life that are so common and widespread, and that appear in so many different real
life circumstances, that a flexible capacity to resolve social contract problems should be
expected to produce some common commitments.243 The purportedly universal and
necessary commitments that theorists often point to—like those concerning promising,
norms against wanton violence, and the like—typically have this quality to them.
To flesh out this form of explanation, one would need to identify plausible
psychologically mechanisms that might allow us to adapt our moral and legal codes to
changing social contract problems. Given the nature of obligata, any such mechanism
would need to meet a number of constraints. To see why this is so, notice, first, that our
moral psychologies will generate an important biological need for coordination over the
perceived content of the right, given the present assumptions. This need derives from a
fact that has already been discussed: for obligata to resolve social contract problems and
allow us to reap the benefits of this cooperation, they must be bound up with second
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order attitudes that function to identify and exclude non-cooperators from the benefits of
these cooperative enterprises.244 Secondary attitudes of this kind are, however, inherently
non-cooperative—and, in fact, often strongly so. Hence, they should involve tendencies
to action that would otherwise be ruled out by the code itself, except in cases where a
prior breach warrants the reaction. Where the contents of the obligata in a group are not
coordinated, this means—somewhat paradoxically—that the very moral psychologies
that allow us to resolve social contract problems, and engage in cooperative social living,
create the possibility of escalating conflict.245 These cycles can occur when actions that
are perceived as a wrong by others, and hence as warranting certain critical or punitive
reactions, produce actions that are, in turn, perceived as a wrong that requires a further
righting—and so on down the line.246
This need for coordination will, moreover, take on a very particular
quality to the extent that our normative psychologies give us a flexible capacity to resolve
changing social contract problems. As already noted, social contract problems are a
species of commitment problem,247 and, hence, they require for their resolution
motivations that cannot be abandoned on just any ground or in just any circumstance.
When adapting our views, maintaining an appropriate modicum of coordination will also
be essential. Hence, any capacity to adapt our views should be ones that allow us to do
so while maintaining both (i) an appropriate modicum of intrapersonal commitment to the
relevant standards of a group and (ii) a similar modicum of interpersonal coordination
over their content.248
Can we identify psychosocial processes that meet these criteria? Allan
Gibbard has recently described our capacities to engage in “normative discussion” as
having just these features. Gibbard argues that the attitudes that are principally involved
in familiar cases of moral judgment are ones that not only motivate action and certain
moral emotions, like guilt and impartial anger, but also manifest themselves in tendencies
to expression and avowal in the special terminology familiar from moral discourse in
contexts of what he calls unconstrained “normative discussion.”249 Gibbard defines
“normative discussion” as including not only substantive moral debate but also a broad
range of other important phenomena that are common in human life—things like gossip,
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the discussion of stories and movies, our interest in “I was like . . . ; He was like”
conversations—and the like.250 Canvassing a number of broad theoretical and
evolutionary considerations, Gibbard argues that the biological function of normative
discussion is to coordinate our normative views.251 He proposes that this coordination is
fostered by tendencies toward mutual influence and by mutual demands for consistency,
along with corresponding inclinations to subject our moral views to norms of
consistency.252 Although Gibbard’s account of what attitudes are coordinated in
normative discussion differs in some important details from the psychological claims
defended here, there is also a great amount of resonance. Gibbard’s arguments about
normative discussion will apply with equal force even if—as this Article claims—
normative discussion were to coordinate obligata rather than the closely related attitudes
that Gibbard has identified.
There is, moreover, now further empirical support for the core aspects of
normative discussion under examination. Jonathan Haidt has recently collected
psychological research suggesting that a significant number of our moral convictions are
held as relatively automatic judgments attuned to particular cases, which he calls
“intuitions.”253 When we take certain things to be morally wrong, we often rely on these
perceptions, and, although we take ourselves to be justified in our views and can
sometimes cite reasons for our views, we also sometimes simply maintain the views
along with the perceptions that they are justified even when we cannot cite any relevant
justification.254 This is the kind of commitment we would expect if a person were to have
an obligatum with a content that ruled out a given action. At the same time, we also
clearly engage in the processes that Gibbard calls “normative discussion,” and Haidt’s
research suggests that the dynamics of normative discussion look very much like what
Gibbard has proposed. In normative discussion, we often express moral judgments, we
give reasons, and we sometimes disagree. We also perceive differences in any attitudes
we are expressing as reflecting genuine inconsistencies, which rationally require one or
the other of us to revise our opinions. Moreover—and this is important—the
psychological research suggests that even if we cannot give each other reasons that the
other finds acceptable in these circumstances, we sometimes leave these episodes with
more agreement than we began, at least in circumstances where we are discussing things
with friends, allies or others with whom we expect to continue interacting. In Haidt’s
words, the processes of expressing our moral intuitions and trying to give reasons for
them in social contexts “exert[s] a constant pressure toward agreement if the two parties
were friends and a constant pressure against agreement if the two parties disliked each
other.”255 Haidt’s research thus suggests that in these contexts, the bare expression of
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conflicting moral intuitions can lead toward consensus. So described, normative
discussion is thus a social process, which—if it were the main locus for shifting our
moral views in the small hunter-gatherer groups that characterized our environment of
evolutionary adaptation—would allow for such shifts to occur while maintaining an
appropriate modicum of intrapersonal commitment to shared norms and interpersonal
coordination over normative content.
Although the preceding discussion has been limited to moral norms, it
should be clear that our legal norms have many of these same features: the content of the
law is essentially contestable,256 and this fact apparently gives us some ability to adapt
our legal norms to unanticipated circumstances. If the natural function of the law were to
allow us to resolve social contract problems in a flexible manner, we would need
psychosocial mechanisms that allow us to adapt our legal norms to changing
circumstances as a group while maintaining an appropriate modicum of (i) intrapersonal
commitment to the law and (ii) interpersonal coordination over its content. Legal
discussion—here defined as the practice of giving and taking reasons concerning what
the law is primarily by lawyers and judges in particular instances of adjudication—meets
these two criteria. In contexts of adjudication, we express views about what the law
requires, we give reasons, and we often disagree. Adjudication nevertheless eventually
issues in a final binding judgment that decides the case at hand, even if that judgment
cannot be derived from reasons that any particular official antecedently accepted.
Importantly, however, the fact that a case has been decided in a final manner does not end
the more general question as to what the law is, and it can thus make sense to ask in later
cases whether a prior case was decided rightly or what the right bearing of a prior case is
on the law.
There are, of course, also many important differences between morality
and law. One important one for present purposes is that the law typically contains what
Hart called “rules of change,” or rules that empower certain officials to legislate and
thereby change the law in a more intentional manner than is typical in morality.257 Rules
allowing for legislation are plainly another critical source of adapatibility in our legal
codes, and these rules plainly allow us to change the law as a group while maintaining an
appropriate modicum of (i) intrapersonal commitment to the law and intrapersonal
coordination over its changing content. A fuller account of the relationship between
morality and law—including how the two are distinct—would thus need to elaborate just
how and why rules allowing for legislation interact with the particular standards that
judges employ to identify the law in various societies in ways that can function well, at
least under the right social and political conditions. A full account would also need to
explain why we would need two distinct coordinating mechanisms and two distinct
classes of obligations, and why the law’s coordinating mechanism would differ in some
ways from morality’s. In my view, developing a plausible account of the relevant kind
will require a specification of the particular classes of social contract problems that
morality and law naturally function to help us resolve, and an elaboration of how these
different classes of problems would require coordination mechanisms with these different
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shapes. I will present my own views on these matters in a subsequent Article, but it
would go beyond the scope of this one to try to elaborate that fuller account here. The
purpose of this Article is more modest: it is to trace out the deep structure that morality
and law share, thus leaving for open the question as to how best to distinguish these
normative phenomena.

I.

CONCLUSION

If the foregoing arguments are correct, then much of the literature on the
law, including many of the descriptive and normative accounts that are familiar from the
law and economics literature, have been presupposing a picture of human psychology
that is deeply at odds with how we naturally think about obligation. There is now a
familiar body of evidence suggesting that we deviate from so called Homo Economicus—
who reasons only instrumentally—in numerous and systematic ways.258 The challenge
posed here, however, runs deeper. It suggests that the basic social psychological building
blocks out of which we create and sustain our moral and legal relations have, and must
have, a deep structure that is at odds with current economic frameworks.259
Morality and law do not arise from, and could not be sustained only by,
separable beliefs about the world and preferences for various states of affairs. Morality
and law are instead animated primarily by obligata, which are distinctive portfolios of
psychological phenomena that come together—as obligato accompaniments must in any
good musical performance—to give morality and law their distinctive lives. Obligata
also have a deep structure, the precise contours of which we must learn to understand
better. They are what might seem to be a miraculous—and, to my mind, incredibly
beautiful—blend of (i) fundamentally agent-centered attitudes toward persons and their
motives and actions, along with (ii) attitudes toward shared standards as giving rise to
(iii) reasons for action that can (iv) override or exclude many other perceived ones arising
from desire or personal interest. Obligata also incline us to (v) react to certain deviations
in punitive or critical manners and to deem such reactions warranted or permitted given
what the deviations say about how others care about us. But obligata also sensitize us to
(vi) the standard excuses, thus allowing us to forgive one another and restore our
friendships and relationships despite seeming breaches—at least if the care is real and the
seeming breach reveals no genuine lack of concern.
We express obligata in (vii) the special normative terminology that
morality and law share, including sometimes in (viii) contexts of discussion or dispute
that can become incredibly charged. These interactions naturally engage our attention,
and matter to us deeply and inescapably. In these interactions, obligata allow us to (ix)
meaningfully disagree, and sometimes reach consensus, even when our resolutions
cannot be traced to any particular reasons we antecedently accepted. Obligata are
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nevertheless (x) judgment-sensitive attitudes—in the sense that reasons can be sensibly
asked and offered for the judgments we make when we express them—and it is often by
this route that we come to terms with one another. Our ability to use this language thus
engages (xi) underlying psychosocial mechanisms that can—in the appropriate social and
political circumstances—help us maintain sufficient agreement over our sense of what we
owe to one another to live well and peaceably together. Obligata thereby give us the
capacity to enjoy our lives together. Finally, it is possible—though the issue has only
been touched upon here and would need to be elaborated further—that our moral and
legal judgments (xii) supervene on natural facts because there are natural facts—about
what moral and legal rules would conduce to all our objective individual interests in the
right way—that partly explain the shape that morality and law take in our lives.
If the arguments in this Article are correct, then the structure of obligata is
the deep structure of morality and law. Accepting this conclusion would entail seeing
that much of the legal literature—including familiar descriptive and normative accounts
from law and economics scholars—have been presupposing a psychological picture that
is deeply at odds with how we naturally think about obligation. Our capacities to reason
instrumentally may not, in fact, figure very centrally at all in our moral or legal practices,
and we may necessarily misunderstand these phenomena if we try to shoehorn them into
that foreign model. To understand morality and law, we must instead learn to understand
better how our distinctive capacities to identify and respond to obligations function.
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